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SUMMARY
Resource allocation can be viewed as the assignment of available resources to differ-
ent populations, projects, or tasks. Usually, resources can be allocated by markets (where
people exchange goods or services based on price and personal preferences) or by central
planning (a central planner or agency makes the decision). In many industrial applications
such as assembling automobiles from parts or assigning time-constrained tasks to proces-
sors, central planning can often yield the optimal result with respect to the entire system.
However, in other settings such as allocating healthcare services to patients, distributing
vaccines to local providers, or assigning jobs to workers, preferences of the individuals
need to be considered in addition to system objectives.
Three practical and theoretical problems are presented that involve allocating resources
to populations with different preferences or demands: 1) measuring the spatial access of
patients across a large network where patients have different preferences over the healthcare
providers, 2) quantifying the benefit of allocating vaccines to local areas based on inventory
information when vaccine uptake rates vary geographically, and 3) assigning workers to
jobs in a multi-period setting with workers and jobs listing preferences over each other. We
use mathematical modeling approaches tailored for each of the problems that allow us to
capture the preferences of populations in each system.
Chapter I provides a brief introduction to the three research problems. Chapter II
presents an optimization framework for measuring healthcare spatial access, where pa-
tients’ choice over service providers are incorporated using notions of equilibria. We ana-
lytically demonstrate the advantages of using optimization approaches to quantify patients’
access to service providers and illustrate these advantages via a case study using data on
Cystic Fibrosis in the United States. Chapter III addresses the value of inventory informa-
tion in distributing vaccines in a flu pandemic, where using vaccine allocation strategies
that utilize inventory information can improve the percentage of demand satisfied, reduce
xv
the disease incidence, and decrease inventory of wasted vaccine. Chapter IV introduces
modeling for stable matching between workers and jobs in a multi-period setting, where
we discuss new notions of stability and model the problem using integer programming with
the preferences of people either staying the same or changing over time. We obtain theoret-
ical bounds on the objective function value under special preference lists and develop fast
heuristics to solve the problem with large number of agents and small number of periods.
In addition, we provide insights on the sufficient and necessary conditions under which
our algorithms and heuristics work well. In conclusion, the problems presented in the the-
sis demonstrate how mathematical modeling can be used to incorporate different types of




The problem of effectively allocating resources to populations with different preferences
arises in many practical situations. In some applications, a central planner allocates re-
sources based on available information and tries to optimize the allocation for the entire
system. However, in other settings such as allocating healthcare services to patients, dis-
tributing vaccines to local providers, or assigning jobs to workers, preferences of the indi-
viduals have to be considered besides the general welfare of the entire system. We address
three practical problems involving allocating resources to people under preferences of dif-
ferent kind.
Patients often have preferences over the location of healthcare providers based on dis-
tances, waiting time, or other factors. Government agencies such as the U.S. Department
of Health maybe interested in assessing the status quo of healthcare access to identify pop-
ulations living in under-served areas. Potential interventions could be implemented in the
future to improve populations’ access to care in these areas.
Usually, the current choices of patients (utilization of services) maybe influenced by
the locations of existing facilities (e.g., patients may choose to move for better access of
care), which may not reflect the underlying access to care. Instead, potential access is often
used in the literature to infer patients’ access to care in current and future health networks.
Existing methods for quantifying access include using simple physician-to-patient ratios or
catchment methods incorporating congestions, but neither of the existing approach consid-
ers adjusting for changes in the entire network or population preferences.
In Chapter II, we present decentralized optimization as a framework to measure pa-
tients’ access to care, incorporating system effects and population preferences. The opti-
mization methods assign patients to provider locations, minimizing the total distance trav-
1
eled and congestion (or waiting time) experienced while satisfying different patients’ de-
mand. We use a Nash equilibrium condition for each visit of a patient to ensure that the
patients will not deviate from their current choices of providers locations. We analytically
demonstrate the accuracy of decentralized optimization compared to the two-step floating
catchment area method and its variations. We also use a case study of specialty care for
Cystic Fibrosis over the continental United States to compare these approaches.
Our analysis shows that the catchment methods overestimate patients’ demand, espe-
cially in dense urban centers and areas with overlapping health service providers. The
catchment methods also capture patients’ opportunity instead of experience and have no
mechanism to capture cascading effects based on congestion. Furthermore, the optimiza-
tion models account for more elements of access (e.g., capacity of each provider and pa-
tient preferences) than the traditional catchment methods. Finally, optimization models
can incorporate user choice and other variations, and they can be useful towards targeting
interventions to improve access. The study is published in BMC Health Service Research
[1].
In Chapter III, we study the value of inventory information in allocation of flu vaccine
with limited supply. Influenza in the US can result in thousands of deaths annually, while
timely vaccination can prevent the disease. However, flu vaccine supply is often limited
because of the production process, especially lead time. At the same time, people’s will-
ingness to receive a vaccine varies geographically, which is quantified as uptake rate at local
levels. During the 2009 H1N1 pandemic in the United States, a federal agency (the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)) coordinated the distribution of limited vaccine
and allocated vaccine proportional to population of states when available (pro-rata). At the
beginning of the pandemic, there was limited vaccine available. However at the end of
February 2010, only half of the available vaccine was administered, resulting in millions of
vaccine being discarded. Reporting of vaccine administration was required during the 2009
H1N1 pandemic, although only a few states chose to track detailed information, such as the
2
geographical location. With the addition of this information to the vaccine registry, it would
be possible to allocate vaccines not only by population, but also according to demands from
local areas.
We use a detailed agent-based stochastic model to simulate the spread of the disease
and study the allocation of limited vaccine supply when the uptake rates vary geographi-
cally. We allocate vaccine proportionally to locations when there is no inventory informa-
tion (Population-Based, or PB strategy). When there is inventory information, we allocate
vaccine proportionally to locations that are continuing to take vaccine (Population-and-
Inventory-Based, or PIB strategy). Using the state of Georgia in the United States as a case
study, our research shows that using strategies that incorporate inventory information can
reduce the number of flu cases, decrease wasted vaccines, and satisfy higher percentage
of demand. Our results emphasize the need for greater visibility in public health supply
chains, which could be achieved through additions to the existing vaccine registry informa-
tion systems.
Finally in Chapter 4, we study a multi-period matching problem with two-sided mar-
kets, complete preference lists, no ties, and relaxed stability. Organizations often need
assignments that can reflect the preferences of workers and jobs (stability), while at the
same time promoting utilities among all workers (quality) to reduce turn-over rate. More
often than not, decisions have to be made across multiple periods to allow organizations
more flexibility in making assignments and negotiating with workers. Our research goal is
to help organizations operationalize their decisions based on the desired level of stability
and quality of assignments.
The notion of stability comes from the stable matching model studied by Gale and
Shapley [2]. In a single period, a matching is stable when any worker-job pair does not
have unilateral incentive to deviate from the current choice. To measure the quality of
matching, a utility function is often applied for each worker-job pair depending on the
positions of jobs on workers’ preference lists. The stable matching concept is widely used
3
because of its elegant theory and applicability, although it does not necessarily provide
matches of good quality for all workers.
We study matchings in a two-sided market in a context of assigning workers to jobs over
multiple periods. In our research, we analyze the trade-offs between stability and quality of
assignments. We focus on the case when the number of workers and jobs is large (hundreds
or thousands) and the number of periods is small (three or four years) as the rationality of
individuals are often limited. The objective function is to maximize the minimum individ-
ual utility summed over all periods as a measure of quality of the matchings (similar to the
min-max regret measure in [3, 4, 5, 6]). We introduce a definition of multi-period stability
by aggregating stability constraints in each period and relaxing the stability requirement.
Furthermore, we develop heuristics to help organizations operationalize decisions and pro-
vide insights on the trade-offs between stability and the quality of matchings. In addition,
we explore settings where workers’ preference lists change over time and provide modified
formulation and heuristics. At last, we characterize the set of preference lists for which our
heuristics return a stable assignment.
Overall, our research provide heuristics that solve large scale problems fast, and we
demonstrate that the performance of these heuristics is good in terms of improving the
quality of matchings from workers’ perspective. We also obtain insights from the structure
of solutions, which could be useful for organizations to implement suitable decision making
tools under various preference settings.
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CHAPTER 2
AN OPTIMIZATION FRAMEWORK FOR MEASURING SPATIAL ACCESS
OVER HEALTHCARE NETWORKS
2.1 Background
Access to healthcare is widely recognized as essential for ensuring not only care of im-
mediate health needs but also to enable health and wellness in the population. Access has
multiple dimensions including accessibility, availability, affordability, accommodation, and
acceptability [7, 8, 9] and is of great importance to decision makers in public health. We
focus on measurement models for spatial access over a health network with patients and
providers, which is most closely related to the elements of accessibility (e.g., location and
travel distance for care) and availability (e.g., coverage or the volume of providers). A
healthcare network is defined as a transportation network with patients as demand nodes
and providers as supply nodes, and an arc between patient and provider if the provider is
accessible for the patient.
The measurement models we studied are designed to measure potential access based on
the services that are available for use relative to population and distance. On the contrary,
realized access reflects actual use of services, which can be affected by finances, behav-
iors, and other factors. Potential access is measurable although it is not observable. An
optimization-based approach is described for quantifying potential access over the health-
care network and for estimating the impact of changes to the network. Optimization is a
mathematical science that is widely accepted in engineering and science as providing a way
to balance complex interactions across a system, and there is a history of using optimiza-
tion to assist medical decision making [10, 11, 12]. Theoretical and practical optimization
modeling techniques are used to assist with health care policy development by measuring
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access and computing the economics behind discrepancy of access. Specifically, questions
such as how optimization models can be used to measure access, on what types of networks
they offer the most accurate estimates of access, and ultimately, why they should be used
for measuring and for suggesting interventions to improve access are addressed. The an-
swers to these questions are useful for improving the health of populations and assisting
with health policy development by informing areas of greatest need.
The optimization models are compared to some existing methods. In particular, com-
parisons are made to variations of the two-step floating catchment area (2SFCA) method
[13], including the Enhanced 2SFCA (E2SFCA) method [14] and the Modified 2SFCA
(MSFCA) method [15], with some discussion of other catchment methods. The catchment
methods, which are offsprings of a gravity model of attractions between populations and
providers, estimate the size of population served at each provider using distance zones and
compute accessibility of a community based on the availability of providers in the commu-
nitys zones; communities can be captured in the zones of multiple providers. In contrast,
optimization models match patients and providers based on both distances and the rela-
tively crowdedness of each provider, and estimate the accessibility of a patient using the
matching results to determine the travel distance and the corresponding crowdedness of
each patient. Optimization models can take on the perspective of a centralized planner in
making assignments, or they can be adapted to directly incorporate patient choice over the
network. To compare the measurement models for spatial access, several specific network
structures are examined, which are designed so that access measures can be compared ana-
lytically. Results on a large case study of specialty care of Cystic Fibrosis (CF), where the
network has varying levels of accessibility are also provided.
Analytically, we demonstrate that the total number of patient visits captured by all
facilities in the 2SFCA methods is larger than the number of visits expected based on
population size. The three-step floating catchment area (3SFCA) method [16] adds an
assignment mechanism to address the competition by facilities, but the assignments are
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only based on distance. In contrast, in the optimization models, the willingness to travel is
not only a function of distance but also of facility congestion including its size. As a result,
the optimization models can capture cascading effects in the system, where a change in
congestion for one population leads to different decisions and thus impacts individuals
in another location. The optimization models also allow for simultaneous estimation of
measures of access across the five dimensions outlined [7].
More generally, optimization models can be adapted to many contexts including dif-
ferent patient types (e.g., Medicaid or not), provider constraints, or others. They are also
useful in optimizing interventions, where the intervention can target different aspects of
access (e.g., distance versus congestion).
2.2 Methods
2.2.1 Optimization Framework
In healthcare decision making and service research areas, optimization models have been
used to determine the best location for a new clinic [17, 18, 19], ensure that resource
locations are sufficient to cover the need across a network [20], route nurses for home health
services [21], improve health outcomes among communities [22, 23], and evaluate policies
for pandemic influenza, breast cancer, and HIV over a network [24, 25, 26], among others.
Wang [27] reviewed several cases where optimization models could be used to improve
access or service over a network.
In our models, the cost of an individual is associated with two dimensions of access
[7]: accessibility and availability. The first is measured with travel distance (or time). The
second is measured with congestion, which for an individual is associated with the relative
number of people (or visits) at a provider compared to the resources available. One can also
think of this as capturing the waiting time until an appointment is available. Studies show
that individuals are willing to drive further to receive an appointment more quickly [28].
Thus we assume that the utility (or disutility) associated with a patients access is a weighted
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sum of the distance and a congestion term, where we scale the congestion term to trade-off
the relative importance between the two. We expect that the congestion weight (α) may be
different for different types of healthcare services, such as primary care or specialty care
(i.e., distance may have a relatively lower cost). The congestion weight can also represent
the resources available at a facility.
Several elements are defined for our formulation. The total number of patients is n and
the total number of facilities is m. Let i ∈ [n] be the indices of patients and j ∈ [m] be the
indices of facilities. The distance between patient i and provider j is dij; vi is the estimated
number of visits that patient i will make (demand); and aj is the congestion weight at
provider j. A dummy location can be introduced for the assignment of demand that cannot
be met.
The decision variables are xij , which is the percentage of time assigned to facility j
from patient or community i, for each i ∈ [n] and j ∈ m. The formulation of the basic
centralized model follows:














xijvi = vi ∀i ∈ [n] (2.2)
0 ≤ xij ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ [n],∀j ∈ [m] (2.3)
The objective function (2.1) states that the total number of visits assigned should be vi
for each patient or community i. Constraint (2.2) requires that all individuals be assigned,
and equation (2.3) requires non-negativity of the decision variables. Each individual’s con-
gestion at a visit is proportional to the total number of visits at that facility scaled by αj .
The congestion term in the objective sums over the congestion experienced by all patients
resulting in an overall term that is squared. The choice of quadratic function comes from
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the following idea: if n patients receives care from a provider location, then each patient
experiences n units of congestion, then the total congestion is n× n = n2. Note that when
α = 0, this model gives equivalent results to assignment by shortest distance, and when
α = ∞, this model gives equivalent results to equally distributing patient visits to each
facility. See section A.1 for a process to select the congestion weight.
For a patient, the number of visits to a close location is expected to be more than the
number of visits to a far location because of the willingness to travel. Thus, the number
of visits to each location using a function that decays with distance is determined. This is
analogous to step 1 in the E2SFCA method where the population is multiplied by a weight.
This also implies that the number of visits covered in the network may be less than 100%.
From the results of an optimization model, several measures of spatial access are calcu-
lated. The measures include i) the distance traveled for each patient or community; ii) the
congestion experienced by each patient or community; iii) the coverage, which is defined
as the ratio of visits assigned to visits needed for an individual or community.
2.2.2 Variations on the Optimization Model
With optimization models, many variations are possible, including through the addition
of constraints, the use of different objective function values, or by differentiating decision
variables by type. Here we describe a major variation in our model, optimization with
user choice (Decentralized), and include many others such as capacity, unmet demand, and
willingness to travel in section A.2.
The traditional deterministic optimization model (as presented above) often assumes
a centralized planner who makes decisions for every patient in a healthcare network to
achieve the best overall objective. However, user choice can be incorporated by an equi-
librium constraint that represents individual choices as in game theory [29]; we call the
resulting optimization model decentralized.
An overall equilibrium solution requires a user choice constraint to be satisfied for each
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patient visit in the network, where the constraint states that the individual cannot improve
their distance and congestion of that visit by switching to another facility given the other
decisions on the network. The decision variable and equilibrium constraint are defined














,∀q 6= j,∀i,∀k (2.4)
The equilibrium condition includes a separate constraint for each patient’s visit and each
location when there is no distance decay function. The left-hand side is the distance and
congestion associated with current facility choice j for a visit k, and the right-hand side is
the distance and congestion at any location other than j. See section A.3 for more details.
2.2.3 Review of Catchment Models








where Sj is the supply at provider j, Pi is the population at location i, w(dij) is the decay
function based on distance of each patient-provider pair (i, j).
The original 2SFCA method was introduced by Luo and Wang [13]; it allows the
catchment of each provider and patient to float based on the distances between each pair.
E2SFCA is a variation that suggests applying different weights within travel time zones
to account for decaying of the willingness to travel as distance increases [14]. Under the
E2SFCA model, in the first step the physician-to-population ratio at each provider is calcu-
lated. Although the E2SFCA aims to estimate the number of patients that may potentially
use a facility, it is easy to extend the metrics to estimate the number of visits by replicating
each patient using visits demanded (e.g., a patient demanding 10 visits can be viewed as 10
10
patients) [30, 31]. We make a minor adjustment to allow for each patient to have multiple







where Sj is the number of physicians available at provider j; Wr is the weight value cor-
responding to the catchment zone of dij. The value of Wr is calculated using the distance
decay function, which is usually nonlinear; Dr is the distance threshold of catchment zone
r. The parameter Vi is the number of potential visits if there is no decay in willingness to
travel or the maximal demand for patient or community i. The original E2SFCA method
introduced the model with three catchment zones, but an extension is to allow a different
number of zones or even a continuous decay (impedance) function across a single zone.
Example choices of impedance functions include Gaussian [13, 32] , exponential, inverse
power, and others; [32] discusses parameter setting for the impedance function.
In the second step of E2SFCA, the method defines the accessibility of each patient or







Another catchment approach is the 3SFCA method, which incorporates competitions
among multiple providers within the same catchment zone of a patient and makes assign-
ments of patients by distance. The M2SFCA method [15] modifies the patient level ac-
cessibility in [13] by multiplying the distance weight twice, while another approach [33]
allows for zones to differ by transportation modes.
For a simple system, the individual measures of spatial access from optimization mod-
els can be combined to directly compare with the accessibility measures of 2SFCA meth-
ods (E2SFCA and M2SFCA). The simplest supply network consists of n communities in
a circular population area with a facility at the center. Let di be the distance from commu-
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nity i to the facility and S the number of physicians in the facility. Calculate the facility
population-to-physician ratio R and patient accessibility Ai using equations 2.6 and 2.7.
Define a decay function w(di) ∈ [0, 1]. For this system, the optimization method is equiv-
alent to assigning by shortest distance. Let F denote the congestion at the facility, then
F = 1/R. The coverage of community i is calculated as w(di). Therefore, for this system,
the patient accessibility is AEi =
coverage
congestion
, for the E2SFCA method. For the M2SFCA
method, a similar calculation can be made, where the composite patient accessibility mea-






In this section, analytical results on accessibility as measured by the optimization method
and catchment models are provided. Most analyses in this section focus on simple systems
where service areas are non-overlapping. For simple networks with overlapping service
areas, the detailed analysis can be found in section A.4. Notations that will be used fre-
quently in the analysis are defined below. The distance decay function w(dij) is between 0
and 1. If dij is the distance between community i and facility j, and vi is the visits needed
by community i, then we assume that facility j receives w(dij)vi visits from community i
as in the catchment models. In optimization models, let pij be the proportion of the popu-
lation in community i that visits facility j.
Result 1 (Opportunities vs. Experiences): Optimization models capture a patient’s ex-
perience rather than their opportunities. As a result, 2SFCA methods tend to overestimate
the total number of visits.
For many catchment models, the estimated accessibility measure increases when more
facility choices are available to a population. However, assignments models (including
optimization and the 3SFCA method), are estimating the cost of potential access, and this
does not increase if a new choice is congested or inconsequential. This is illustrated with
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a simulated system of populations and facilities, as in Delamater (2013) [15] . Consider
Figure 2.1: System 1, with populations 100 at location X and 1 at Y . Facilities A and B
each have 10 beds.
System 1 as described in Figure 1. When facility A and population X are sufficiently far
from B and Y , the catchment models and the optimization method will provide the same
accessibility estimate. Consider a second system, where B and Y are both closer to X
and A than in the first system, with the distances between A − X and B − Y retained
and b closer to Y than A. The 2SFCA methods show that the accessibility of Y increases
due to the possibility of service at A, while the accessibility of X decreases because of
demand on facility A from population Y . However, the optimization method shows there
is no change in accessibility for reasonable congestion weights. From the perspective of
a person at Y , service at facility A would be associated with a higher congestion cost and
a further distance, thus he would neither be assigned to facility A nor choose that facility.
This is still the cost associated with potential access rather than realized access, but the cost
is associated with the potential experience of a patient. In contrast, the 2SFCA methods
always realize additional choices regardless of their relative competitiveness to existing
choices. Therefore the total number of visits implied by the 2SFCA methods is higher
compared to the optimization method, and can be higher than the total number of visits
demanded.
Result 2 (System Effects): The 2SFCA methods do not capture the cascading effects based
on congestion.
For methods focused primarily on catchment zones without assignment, there are some
system effects that may not be captured over the network. To illustrate this, define System
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Figure 2.2: Systems 2 through 5, with populations as specified at location X , Y , and Z.
Facilities A and B each have 10 beds, and the distance weights are provided between
locations.
2, with population z added to system 1, and with a population of 100 for each of X, Y,
and Z. In this system, the optimization method and the 3SFCA both compute the same
accessibility for each population, while in the 2SFCA methods the accessibility is higher
for Y since it is capturing opportunities for access rather than the patient experience.
Consider System 3 with increased population at location Z. In the catchment models,
as the population of Z increases, the accessibility for Y and Z decrease, while the acces-
sibility for X remains the same no matter how large Z is. In the optimization method, as
Z gets larger, more of the population from Y goes to facility A, so the accessibility at all
population locations decreases. The accessibility at each location is the same because the
system is constructed in a very specific and symmetric way.
A similar effect can be seen when System 2 is varied by moving population Z further
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away from the center (System 4). In this case, more patients from Y switch to B to reduce
congestion, resulting in better access for population X in the optimization method, while
the 2SFCA methods show no change for X .
Define System 5 the same as 1 but with an unbreakable barrier separating population
Y in half, and a population of Z equal to 150. The 3SFCA quantifies the same access
with and without the barrier, because the assignment is based on distance alone. On the
other hand, the optimization method shows different access in System 5 compared to 3,
because assignment is based on both distance and congestion. The accessibility estimates
for the different systems are summarized in Table 2.1. Result 3 (Composite Measures vs.
Table 2.1: Accessibility estimates for systems 2 to 5.
E2SFCA M2SFCA
System X Y Z X Y Z
2 0.05 0.1 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.04
3 0.05 0.083 0.033 0.04 0.067 0.027
4 0.05 0.106 0.044 0.04 0.084 0.028
5 0.067 Y1 = 0.067, Y2 = 0.05 0.05 0.053 Y1 = 0.053, Y2 = 0.04 0.04
Optimization AE Optimization AM
2 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.053 0.053 0.053
3 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.046 0.046 0.046
4 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.057 0.057 0.037
5 0.067 Y1 = 0.067, Y2 = 0.05 0.05 0.053 Y1 = 0.053, Y2 = 0.04 0.04
Individual Measures): The composite measures of the 2SFCA methods are insufficient to
distinguish multiple elements of access. Consider systems 6 to 8. System 6 has 100 people
inX and 10 beds inA, and the distance weight betweenX andA is 0.1. System 7 is similar
to system 6 but with a distance weight 0.2 (which implies the population is closer to the
facility). System 8 is similar to system 7 but has 5 beds in A. As we move from system 6
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Figure 2.3: Systems 6 to 8, with population of 100 at location X , and a single facility with
either 5 or 10 beds. Distance weights are provided for each system.
Table 2.2: Accessibility estimates for systems 6 to 8.
System E2SFCA M2SFCA Opt Coverage Opt Congestion
6 0.1 0.01 0.1 1
7 0.1 0.04 0.2 2
8 0.05 0.01 0.2 4
to system 7 and then to system 8, either the population is closer to the facility, the facility
has fewer beds, or both, so the network is getting more congested and the accessibility of
X should reflect this change. However, as Delamater [15] points out, the E2SFCA method
shows the same accessibility for populations in system 6 and 7. Similarly, the M2SFCA
method shows the same accessibility for populations in system 6 and 8.
The individual measures in the optimization method indicate the coverage increases as
you move to system 8 but that the congestion also increases (see Table 2.2).
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2.3.2 Case Study
The analytical analysis above illustrates several direct comparisons between the 2SFCA
methods and the optimization method. In this section access is estimated for the specific
health service network associated with Cystic Fibrosis (CF), which is a chronic condition
that requires specialty care. Recent studies have shown that Medicaid status is related to
survival rate and outcomes [34], but spatial access may also be a factor. The condition has
prevalence in the United States of about 30,000 patients with 208 CF care centers in the
continental US [35]. Though it is a rare disease, the service network displays heterogeneity,
with the spatial access varying greatly over the network.
Focusing on potential spatial access, locations of CF patients are simulated according
to the incidence of the disease rather than using existing locations of actual patients (which
may be biased by service locations). With CF, the population eligible for Medicaid is
considered separately, since they may need to receive service in their home state. 30,000
virtual patients are generated with CF located in county centroids in the continental US,
where the prevalence was generated proportionally to the populations in each race/ethnicity
who are above or below 2 times the federal poverty level [36], using the incidence matrix
for race/ethnicity in section A.5 Table A.1. Patient demand is defined as 10 visits per
year to a center (which captures more than 90% of the patients with location information
available in the CF Foundation Registry data [35]). We assume the actual number of visits
is decreasing with the distance to selected service facility, patients will not visit facilities
more than 150 miles away (again, this captures more than 90% of the patients in the registry
with location information [35]). We also assume that low-income patients will only visit a
CF center within the patient’s state due to restrictions of the Medicaid program.
The zip code of each CF center (see section A.6) is obtained using patient encounter
data from the CF Foundation [35], and the road distance from each CF virtual patient to
each CF center is computed using Radical Tools [37]. We assume all facilities are the same
size (e.g., can serve 1500 visits a year); the exact number can be changed and the relative
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comparisons between methods will hold.
Accessibility measures were calculated for E2FSCA, M2SFCA, and the decentralized
(with user choice) optimization model. The optimization model was implemented using C++
and the CPLEX solver on a UNIX system. The decay functions are such that 10 visits will
be made when distance is zero, and visits approach zero when distance is 150 miles; see
specific functions in section A.7 Table A.2. There are many functions that can be used to
model the decaying willingness of travel. We have chosen to use the exponential function
for the rare disease setting of Cystic Fibrosis. Because CF is rare and access to care is
relatively low compared to primary care, patients are willing to travel longer distances than
for some conditions. The parameter used in the case study was calibrated to be in line with
the CF registry data (see section A.6 Figure A.5. For the optimization model, a congestion
weight of 10 is used unless otherwise specified (see section A.1). For the 2SFCA methods,
Medicaid patients were only included in catchment areas of facilities in their own states.
Maps of the decentralized optimization model display the distance traveled and the
congestion experienced by each person, averaged at the county level, in Figure 2.4(A) and
2.4(B) (uncovered demand is shaded in both maps, and centers are marked with pins). In
general, distance is small close to centers, especially in areas with multiple centers such as
the coastal northeast. There are a few pockets with higher distance, especially in parts of the
West. Congestion is higher in a few areas, such as around Houston and some parts of Ohio
and Pennsylvania. Some counties have no simulated patients, while others have uncovered
demand, such as in many counties in the Midwest or Western regions. There are also
isolated areas that are uncovered, such as near southwest Georgia, southern Missouri, and
some counties at the boundary of the US. A summary histogram is provided for distance,
congestion and coverage for each county in section A.6 Figure A.4. The distribution of
coverage shows that many needed visits are not met, due to the distance patients need to
travel to CF centers.
The composite measure AE generated from the decentralized optimization model is
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Figure 2.4: Optimization results for patient cost of potential access. (A) Distance, and (B)
Congestion.
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Figure 2.5: Results comparing optimization model with E2SFCA and M2SFCA for CF
care in US. (A) Decentralized model composite measure AE , , (B) E2SFCA-AE .
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shown in Figures 2.5(A). The main areas with high accessibility are near CF centers and
around urban areas. There are pockets of low accessibility in many places; however, these
can occur for different reasons. In Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Columbus, Ohio, Figure
2.5(A) shows that the congestion was high, while in Springfield, Missouri, Figure 2.5(A)
shows that the travel distance is high. Pockets of low accessibility in New York arise from
a combination of longer distances and higher congestion.
Figure 2.5(B) show the difference between the decentralized optimization model com-
posite measures and the E2SFCA method using the same scale. In comparison to the op-
timization approach, the E2SFCA method tends to show higher accessibility in areas with
many centers (e.g., near Los Angeles and around New York). It also shows higher acces-
sibility in many areas that lie in overlapping service areas for centers (e.g., northern South
Carolina, eastern Arkansas, and New Mexico). A pairwise t-test (1-tail) shows that for
counties with more than 50 patients (127 large counties) or less than 5 patients (1289 small
counties), the measure from the E2SFCA method is significantly higher than measures from
the optimization method (respectively, with p-values 0.20×10−6 and 2.00×10−2); for coun-
ties of other sizes (medium counties), the test is inconclusive. The F -test shows that for all
groups of counties, the variance of the E2SFCA measure is higher (with p = 1.88 × 10−4
for small counties, p < 10−6 for medium counties, and p = 3.90×10−2 for large counties).
The MannWhitney-Wilcoxon test shows that E2SFCA measure is greater in location shift
than the optimization composite measure with p < 10−6 for small and medium counties,
and p = 2.02× 10−2 for large counties. The finding is consistent with the analytical results
in section A.4 showing that with overlapping catchment areas, E2SFCA quantifies higher
access when distances are relatively small. The comparison between AM and the access
measure of the M2SFCA method is similar but with a smaller difference.
The number of visits captured in the E2SFCA methods is shown in Figure 2.6 in com-
parison to the visits needed by the population. It is highest around facilities, and especially
with multiple facilities such as around New York. For the optimization model, the realized
21
Figure 2.6: Estimated patient visits in E2SFCA and M2SFCA relative to the visits needed
in each county. A value greater than 1 indicates that the 2SFCA methods estimate more
visits than needed.
visits per facility are estimated to be 0 to 3,000. In contrast, the range for the E2SFCA result
is 0 to 10,540 per facility. The F -test indicates that the variance of the facility congestion is
significantly higher for the E2SFCA approach, with a p-value less than 10−6. This is similar
to the analytical result that the optimization model always has a lower facility congestion.
The results showing access over the network indicate a number of areas that have un-
covered populations, high congestion, and/or high travel distances. Figure 2.7 shows the
results in several local areas after network interventions. One new facility was added to
the network in locations with uncovered populations (Springfield, MO), and the capacity
of existing facilities was doubled in two locations (Columbus, OH; and Pittsburgh, PA).
For the E2SFCA methods, the gain in access is centered over the interventions and decays
with distance within 150 miles. The gain is positive in all areas with change, as the new
facilities increase the opportunities available. Under the optimization method, the cover-
age in an area increases when a new facility is added, and congestion in an area decreases
when new capacity is added. Although the total access increases, some populations show a
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Figure 2.7: Optimization results showing impact of intervention near locations Springfield,
MO, Columbus, OH, and Pittsburgh, PA. (A) Access gain under optimization using com-
posite measure AE , and (B) access gain under E2SFCA.
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worse composite measure, which indicates that they are traveling shorter distances but ex-
periencing higher congestion (or the reverse) based on new network dynamics. Note also
that when the new location is added in Springfield, there are cascading effects under the
optimization approach, and access increases for the population around Jefferson City, since
their congestion is decreasing due to the new facility. We performed a t-test comparing
the impact of intervention on both measures, and the test shows that the E2SFCA measure
changes significantly more compared to the optimization measure, which is consistent with
our discussion above.
2.4 Discussion
The optimization method provides several innovations useful both for understanding access
and designing interventions. They can be applied across heterogeneous networks with both
dense and sparse areas, and they allow user choice to balance travel and congestion within
communities. The approach presented includes a way to select the specific parameters
of a model. Optimization models also provide both a picture of the status quo and an
approach for evaluating a potential change to a network. Fundamentally, the optimization
models have a different framework than many catchment methods, since they estimate the
access costs associated with a patient’s experience (albeit the potential experience rather
than actual utilization).
Under optimization models, the presence of additional opportunities only provides
gains in potential access when they provider better access compared to existing oppor-
tunities, while in the 2SFCA methods, additional opportunities always provides gains in
potential access. This difference shows that many 2SFCA methods over count visits when
there are facilities with overlapping catchment zones. This effect is stronger in areas with
the greatest infrastructure of health services, so interpreting accessibility over a network
with sparse and dense areas may not be reasonable. One could adapt the approach by di-
viding the population by the number of facilities in the zone, or use other adaptations as in
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the assignment mechanism of the 3SFCA approach. However, these adaptations do not ad-
dress other issues, such as the cascading effects across the system. The catchment methods
tend to capture effects in a defined area, but they do not capture the interactions between
areas (or the cascading effects over a network if there are changes introduced) as well as
assignment models do. This also means catchment methods may mis-estimate availability
across a network for complicated networks.
Using optimization models for estimating access has many other advantages, as they
can be easily adapted to measure access for different types of patients, over different
provider types, or with capacity constraints in the network. Moreover, decentralized opti-
mization models allow differences in access in rural and urban areas, which arises directly
from the trade-off between distance and congestion rather than solely from different dis-
tance functions. It is also easy to modify optimization models to determine the best loca-
tions for facilities given an existing demand and supply network [18, 19]. The individual
measures from optimization models show not only where to intervene, but also points to
what kind of intervention is needed (e.g., new location to reduce distance versus more ca-
pacity to reduce congestion). This is especially true as one moves beyond just one measure
of access like spatial accessibility to consider the other dimensions of access [7].
This study focus on estimating potential health access using optimization models. There
are limitations with the approach. The optimization models assume that patients are trading
off travel distance and congestion rationally across a network, while in reality there might
be many other factors considered by patients. In addition, the optimization models are built
using deterministic known data. In the case study, the possibility of using satellite clinics
or services provided through telemedicine are not considered. Results are also dependent
on the specific decay function chosen. Furthermore, the case study also assumes that the
transportation modes used by all patients are the same.
Optimization models come at a cost. They are less familiar to many working in public
health or public policy. They can be complex to model or compute, although this may be a
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matter more of the appropriate training than extensive computing power.
It may be most important to use optimization models when a network has facilities with
overlapping zones, when one wants to capture the nuances of access across populations, or
when one needs to develop interventions to improve access. We hope that the use of op-
timization models will provoke more discussion in how to measure access, and ultimately
how to improve access, especially in light of the increase in computing power and big data
that will be coming online in the US health system.
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CHAPTER 3
VALUE OF INVENTORY INFORMATION IN ALLOCATING A LIMITED
SUPPLY OF INFLUENZA VACCINE DURING A PANDEMIC
3.1 Background
Influenza in the United States has led to thousands of deaths annually over the past decade
[38], and historically, there has been a world-wide pandemic about every 30 to 40 years
[39]. The last declared pandemic was due to the H1N1 virus in 2009, leading to an es-
timated average of 363,550 deaths worldwide [40]. Timely vaccination can prevent the
spread and reduce the burden of the disease.
Influenza vaccine supply is often limited, especially during a pandemic [38]; hence,
vaccine allocation decisions can play a significant role in the overall impact of vaccination
on reducing the disease burden. In the United States, the most recent emergency vaccine
distribution campaign (2009-2010) was coordinated by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC). As new batches of vaccine became available, they were allocated to each
state proportional to the states population (i.e., population based or pro-rata allocation).
[41]). The states then distributed the vaccine inventory locally, and providers administered
vaccines to individuals.
During the 2009-2010 influenza pandemic, states were encouraged to collect and report
data about the vaccines administered to the general population [42]. However, very few
states collected detailed information on how many vaccines were administered in each
location (e.g., a county or a census tract) [43]. As a result, states did not have a good
visibility into the uptake rates and vaccine inventory levels geographically. This lack of
visibility in the vaccine supply chain caused some areas to end the influenza season with
excess inventory (i.e., leftover vaccine) while other areas (especially those with high uptake
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rates) experienced unmet demand.
This study aims to quantify the value of information on (or visibility into) vaccine in-
ventory, i.e., tracking inventory levels geographically and over time, and how the use of
such information in vaccine allocation decisions can improve the overall impact of vacci-
nation. Information on the quantity of vaccines administered versus leftover in inventory in
different locations could inform the decisions on how to allocate the next batch of vaccines
geographically. Such visibility could be achieved in various ways, e.g., through vaccine
registries.
Combining shipment and registry information would provide visibility into adminis-
tered and leftover vaccine inventory. For example, the state of Oregon collects immuniza-
tion data from both public and private health care providers to create vaccination records
for individuals and reports immunization rates by county for the seasonal influenza vac-
cine. [44]. Ultimately, it is expected that the value of inventory visibility is most important
when the vaccine supply is limited, which is often the case during an influenza pandemic.
Vaccine inventory information, updated geographically and over time, could help reduce
vaccine wastage while meeting the demand of the population in a fair and equitable manner,
and reduce the disease burden by decreasing the number of infections.
3.2 Relevant Literature
Some of the literature on the allocation of limited vaccine supply focus on prioritizing
certain sub-populations by age or other health risks and evaluating the benefits of targeting a
limited vaccine supply [45, 46, 47, 48, 49], in line with the vaccine recommendations from
the Advisory Committee for Immunization Practice (ACIP) [50] in the United States, where
the risk groups may be specific to an influenza strain. Some researchers have quantified the
benefit from the availability and allocation of vaccines early in a pandemic [51]. Prior work
addressing the geographical allocation of a limited vaccine supply is scarce. Matrajt et al.
propose a mathematical model to distribute vaccine in a network of cities in Southeast Asia
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connected by the airline transportation network; they find that a city-specific allocation
strategy can reduce the attack rate substantially but at the expense of fairness [52]. Araz
et al. consider the allocation of limited vaccine between and within the counties in the
state of Arizona in the United States based on expected epidemic waves [53]. They find
that a pro-rata strategy is effective when considering both the infection attack rate and the
lead time for receiving vaccine inventory. Other authors consider shipping vaccines in two
phases, where vaccines in the second phase may be sent to regions where the epidemic is
not yet contained [54].
This paper proposes a modified pro-rata allocation strategy with respect to the demand
for vaccine, by utilizing vaccine inventory information and allocating the available vaccine
supply to any location where the individuals continue to request the vaccine. This is par-
ticularly important when uptake rates vary across population groups or geographical [55,
44, 56]. The proposed strategy thus maintains fairness with respect to the underlying de-
mand from the population. Note that when the uptake rates are similar across geographical
regions, the proposed strategy is equivalent to the traditional pro-rata (population based)
strategy; however, the proposed strategy is more effective (in terms of reducing the number




We adapt a simulation-based disease spread model and use data from the state of Georgia
in the United States with heterogeneous population mixing to predict the spread pattern of
the disease both geographically and temporally. We use a detailed Susceptible-Exposed-
Infected-Recovered (SEIR) model that tracks the disease status of an individual (we use one
million simulated individuals, or agents, to represent the ten million population in the state
of Georgia) as the disease spreads through a contact network by interactions in households,
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workplaces, schools, and communities. The model is flexible and can be run with data from
other locations.
The method builds upon a previously-established agent-based simulation model [24,
57, 58]. Two main assumptions of the model are as follows (see Figure B.1 and B.2 in
section B.1 for details):
• Every individual is in one of following stages at a given time: susceptible (S), ex-
posed (E), pre-symptomatic (IP ), asymptomatic (IA), symptomatic (IS), hospital-
ized (H), recovered (R), or dead (D).
• The entire population has three levels of mixing: (i) community (day and night), (ii)
peer groups (day), and (iii) household (night).
At the start of a simulation run, the entire population contact network is generated and
every individual is susceptible. An initial virus is introduced randomly to infect individ-
uals in selected census tracts. An infected individuals disease status changes to exposed
(E). With pre-defined probabilities, the disease progresses within infected individuals and
spreads to previously healthy individuals across the network. Once recovered (R) from the
disease, the individual remains in that state.
To assess the effect of vaccination under different vaccine allocation strategies, we ex-
pand this simulation model by adding the option of vaccination; within fourteen days of
vaccination, a person becomes immune to the disease (i.e., moves to the recovered state)
with a positive probability [38].
The simulation outputs include the spatial and temporal estimates of the spread of the
disease under different vaccine allocation strategies. The total infection attack rate (IAR)
represents the cumulative percentage of the population who have been infected during the
epidemic. The peak prevalence is the maximum percentage of the population infected at a
given time.
An important parameter in the model is R0, the reproductive number, which measures
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the transmission potential of the virus (i.e., the expected number of secondary infections
caused by a typical infection). The analysis is presented for R0 = 1.5; similar insights are
obtained for R0 = 1.8 and R0 = 2.0.
3.3.2 Vaccine Allocation and Uptake
Since the capacity for the influenza vaccine is limited during a pandemic, vaccine supply
becomes available in batches over time. Vaccine allocation begins in a vaccination start
week and continues (e.g., on a weekly basis) until all the vaccine inventory is depleted or
unmet demand reaches zero. Beginning with the vaccination start week, batches of vaccine
arrive at each census tract in amounts that depend on the vaccine allocation strategy and
the total vaccine availability.
The uptake rates often differ from one geographical location to another [56]. At the
beginning of the simulation, we randomly select a subset of individuals (according to the
uptake rate) in each census tract as willing to receive the vaccine. During each week,
available vaccine is administered (randomly) to the individuals in that census tract who
would like to be vaccinated, have not been infected previously, and are asymptomatic.
We consider two cases, where census tracts do and do not keep track of and report the
remaining vaccine inventory levels on a weekly basis. When inventory levels are known
geographically, they can inform the allocation strategy. The general principle is that areas
with unused inventory could potentially receive less vaccine in the next allocation period.
We consider two strategies for allocating vaccine: (1) Population-Based (PB) (or pro-
rata) strategy delivers available vaccine in each period proportional to the population size of
each census tract. This is similar to the practice followed by many states during 2009-2010
[41]. (2) Population and Inventory-Based (PIB) strategy allocates vaccine (in proportion to
the remaining unvaccinated population in each census tract) only to those census tracts that
have zero inventory, i.e., those that already administered all the vaccine that was shipped
earlier. PIB is motivated by a strategy used by manufacturers for allocating a limited supply
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of resources [59, 60]. When the uptake rates are equal in all census tracts, the PB and PIB
strategies are equivalent. Detailed descriptions of both strategies ae presented in section
B.2.
Each strategy is evaluated based on several criteria including the disease spread (e.g.,
IAR), operational aspects (e.g., vaccines shipped, administered, or leftover), and the service
level (vaccine administered divided by the total number of susceptible individuals willing
to receive the vaccine).
3.3.3 Experiments
We ran experiments simulating various scenarios with different parameters including vac-
cination start week (week four and seven), total vaccine supply (20%, 40%, 60%, and 80%
of the population), time horizon over which the vaccine is delivered to census tracts (four,
eight, and twelve weeks), and three different uptake rate settings: UTR1: half of the census
tracts have uptake rate 25% and the other half 75%. UTR2: half of the census tracts have
uptake rate 0% and the other half 100%. UTR3: each census tracts uptake rate is randomly
chosen from a uniform distribution between 0% and 100%.
We summarize all experimental parameters and provide justifications in Table B.1 (sec-
tion B.3). To account for randomness, we generate five distinct contact networks and within
each network we perform ten simulation runs (replications) for each uptake rate setting (see
section B.4 for the analysis of the number of replications needed [61]). Hence, there are a
total of 5×10 = 50 simulation runs for each of the 2×3×4 = 24 parameter combinations
across three uptake rate settings, resulting in a total of 72 scenarios and 3,600 simulation
runs.
3.4 Results
We present results comparing the scenarios of no vaccination, and vaccine allocation under
the PB and PIB strategies for R0 = 1.5 and UTR1, focusing on IAR and the percentage
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of leftover (i.e., allocated but not administered) vaccine inventory. Results on UTR2 and
UTR3 are presented in section B.5. Unless stated otherwise, the results presented in this
section are the average for the scenarios where the vaccination start week is four and the
vaccine allocation horizon is eight weeks.
3.4.1 No Vaccination versus Vaccination under the PB Strategy
Without vaccination, the peak prevalence is 2.8%, which occurs around week ten, and the
IAR is 50.1% (averaged over multiple simulation runs). The prevalence in every census
tract is positive, and census tracts around the city of Atlanta have a higher IAR than rural
census tracts.
When vaccine is available for 40% of the population and distributed under the PB strat-
egy, the peak prevalence (1.2%) and IAR (23.4%) are lower and the peak occurs earlier
compared to the no vaccination case (see section B.6 for further discussion). Vaccination
under the PB strategy has a lower peak prevalence and IAR when vaccine is distributed
earlier and over a shorter period.
Selected comparisons on peak prevalence and IAR under various parameters of vacci-
nation are presented in section B.7. Detailed results for all combinations of vaccination
start week, vaccine delivery horizon, and total available vaccine supply are presented in
Table B.2 to B.10 in section B.5.
3.4.2 Vaccination under PB versus PIB Strategies
IAR relative to the total population under PIB is on average -0.1% to 1.2% lower than that
under PB (Figure 3.1). These results, except for when the vaccine supply is 20% of the
population, are significant under a two-sample t-test with a 95% confidence level. IAR
under UTR1 is generally lower than that under UTR2 and UTR3 for both PB and PIB,
when all other parameters are the same. The average difference in IAR between PB and
PIB (PB - PIB) ranges from 4.0% to 6.4% under UTR2 and 0.9% to 1.6% under UTR3.
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Figure 3.1: IAR under PB and PIB strategies.
Detailed comparisons in IAR and t-test results are shown in section B.5.
Additional results (presented in section B.6) indicate that an earlier vaccination start
week and shorter vaccine distribution horizon reduce the IAR.
Figure 3.2 shows the number of vaccines shipped and administered under PB and PIB
strategies. The solid, striped, and combined columns represent the vaccines administered,
leftover, and shipped during the entire horizon, respectively. Under PIB, the total shipment
is lower or the same, but the total amount of vaccine administered is higher compared to
PB; hence, vaccine utilization (and service level) is higher, and the leftover inventory is
lower under PIB. For example, when the vaccine supply is equal to 40% of the population,
both PB and PIB ship all the available vaccine, but PIB administers 674 thousand more
doses than PB. As a result, the leftover inventory is 20.7% of the total shipped under PB
versus 3.8% of the total shipped under PIB.
The cost of the leftover vaccine inventory is estimated using information from a pre-
vious study in New York City [62, 63]. The (per dose) vaccine production cost is $5.0 to
$10.0, distribution cost is $1.5 to $5.0, and disposal cost is $0.1 to $1.0. When the vaccine
supply is sufficient to cover 40% of the population, PIB ships the same amount of vac-
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Figure 3.2: Vaccine shipped, administered, and leftover in inventory, as a percentage of the
total population.
cine and results in 674 (95% CI on PIB-PB, 670 to 679, p < 0.0001) thousand less doses
of leftover vaccine (or equivalently, more doses of administered vaccine) compared to PB
(Figure 3.1). Hence, the estimated cost savings under PIB versus PB range from $4.4 to
$10.9 million.
We also calculate the service levels under PB and PIB strategies. Demand refers to the
number of people who were willing to receive the vaccine (calculated by multiplying the
population in an area with the uptake rate), and Served refers to the number of people who
were vaccinated. Service level is defined as Served/Demand × 100%. When the vaccine
supply is sufficient to cover 40% of the population, the mean service levels under PB and
PIB for census tracts with 75% uptake rate are 55.8% and 73.5% (95% CI on PIB-PB,
17.7% to 17.8%, p < 0.0001), respectively. For census tracts with 25% uptake rate, the
average service level for PB and PIB are 97.8% and 97.9% (0.0% to 0.1%, p = 0.0058),
respectively. Additional results and details are presented in section B.7.
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3.5 Discussion
The results indicate that the PIB strategy dominates the PB strategy across multiple metrics.
Given a fixed amount of vaccine supply, more vaccine is administered to the population
(higher service levels), resulting in similar or lower IAR under PIB versus PB. Since PIB
ships the vaccine (over time, as new batches become available) to those areas where there
is still demand for the vaccine, versus shipping it to areas where the demand is saturated,
it ships less vaccine, and hence, incurs a lower transportation cost and lower amount of
leftover inventory, compared to PB. Note that the percentage of population vaccinated in
any geographic area is higher under PIB versus PB; hence, the benefits of PIB are realized
while maintaining fairness.
IAR under PIB is similar to or lower than that under PB. A 1.0% drop in IAR (with
vaccine supply of 40% in Figure 3.2) implies approximately 100 thousand fewer influenza
cases in the state of Georgia. In general, the reduction in IAR under PIB versus PB pos-
itively correlates with the variability in the uptake rates across locations (IAR reduction
is the highest under UTR2 and the lowest under UTR1), i.e., the higher the variability
in the uptake rates, the higher the benefits of PIB over PB. Additional results and discus-
sions on the changes in IAR when the uptake rates are correlated geographically or when
considering herd immunity can be found in section B.7.
Leftover (unused) vaccine inventory often incurs extra cost (including storage and dis-
posal), as experienced during the last phase of the H1N1 influenza vaccine campaign [64,
65, 66]. These costs are even higher if the leftover vaccine is treated as a hazardous waste,
as was required in some states for vaccine containing thimerosal. Inventory visibility en-
ables the implementation of allocation strategies such as PIB, reducing the amount and the
cost of leftover vaccine inventory, and the potential negative environmental impact.
Visibility in inventory has additional benefits that have not been explored in this study.
For example, inventory information can be used to learn the uptake rate in each census
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tract, and states could design policies or information campaigns for areas with low uptake
rates to create awareness, which could result in an increase in vaccination rates across the
population and greater reductions in IAR. The lower number of infections along with the
cost savings enabled by the PIB strategy would free up valuable resources which could be
invested elsewhere to improve the availability and access to public health services.
Overall, this study suggests that visibility of inventory information in public health
supply chains can have many benefits. Some states have adopted systems and practices to
increase visibility in supply chains,7 and others may want to consider the potential benefits
and costs of such practices. Ultimately, investments towards increasing the visibility in
public health supply chains could increase effectiveness (reducing the disease burden) and
efficiency (saving cost), while promoting equity (fairness).
3.6 Limitations
We assume that the uptake rates, i.e., the willingness to receive the vaccine, are constant
over time (but we allow the uptake rates to vary by location). In practice, uptake rates may
vary over time, e.g., they may be lower towards the end of the epidemic. However, since
we limit the vaccine allocation horizon to several weeks around the peak (where one would
expect the awareness about the epidemic to be high) it is reasonable to assume that the
uptake rates would be somewhat stable during the vaccine allocation horizon.
The benefits of inventory visibility could be even higher when the uptake rates vary over
time. For example, a decreasing trend in uptake rates might prompt a local government to
increase efforts in generating public awareness regarding the benefits of vaccination, and
conversely, and increasing trend could be communicated to the upper levels of the vaccine
supply chain to ensure inventory availability.
In the models, we track the vaccine inventory in a semi-aggregate fashion for computa-
tional efficiency (e.g., vaccine inventory levels are computed for about 1,600 census tracts
in the model vs. more than ten thousand providers in practice). There are well-known
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results in the supply chain management literature indicating that as the number of loca-
tions holding the inventory increases, stocking levels and costs increase (to meet a desired
service level), or alternatively, service levels decrease for a given fixed amount of inven-
tory. Hence, in practice, given a high number of inventory locations and potentially higher
variability between uptake rates among different locations, we expect that the PIB strategy
could be even more beneficial compared to the PB strategy.
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CHAPTER 4
MULTI-PERIOD MATCHING UNDER RELAXED STABILITY
4.1 Introduction
Large-scale assignment and reassignment of workers to jobs with preferences is a common
practice for many organizations. Making decisions over multiple periods allows organiza-
tions to balance desired and undesired assignments for workers or rotate workers through
a set of functional roles. For example, the World Food Program (WFP) often rotate their
workers among global locations; the U.S. Navy assigns more than 320,000 military officers
to jobs of different functions annually [67]; and the National Resident Matching Program
(NRMP) assigns more than 30,000 medical school graduates to residency in the U.S. each
year [68].
In practice, workers are often asked to rank jobs in order of preference, and jobs rank
workers based on their skill sets or according to their past performance. Similar to the
generalized assignment problem, a utility function is usually applied for each worker-job
pair to measure the quality of assignment. The utility function can depend on the position
of job in worker’s preference list, or the position of worker in job’s preference lists, or
both. For example, the min-max regret measure is commonly used to measure the quality
of assignment [3, 4, 5, 6]. In the context of assigning jobs to workers, the quality of an
assignment is often measured from the workers’ perspective. The number of workers and
jobs can be large (hundreds or thousands), while the number of periods can be relatively
small (three or four years).
It can be important for organizations to keep workers happy by satisfying their pref-
erences and providing assignments of good quality, which boosts morale and increases
retention. One of the most commonly used framework for solving assignment problems
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with preferences is the Gale-Shapely stable matching model [2], in which the concept of
stability is used to capture preferences and willingness to stay in two-sided markets. While
satisfying preferences, organizations also need to ensure the quality of assignment for each
worker, as there can be trade-offs between the two objectives.
In this research, we study assignments of workers to jobs over multiple periods in a
two-sided market. The workers’ and jobs’ preference lists are complete, and there are no
ties. To satisfy preferences, we introduce a definition of multi-period stability by aggre-
gating the stability constraint in each period and relaxing the stability requirement. The
objective function is to ensure the quality of assignments by maximizing the minimum in-
dividual utility of workers summed over all periods. We formulate an integer program,
obtain bounds on the objective function value, develop heuristics to help organizations op-
erationalize decisions, and provide insights on the trade-offs between stability and the qual-
ity of matchings. In addition, we explore settings where workers’ preference lists change
over time and provide modified formulation and heuristics. At last, we characterize the set
of preference lists for which our heuristics provide a stable assignment.
Our research adds to the existing research, which mainly considers single-period and
static settings or does not capture the trade-offs between stability and the quality of as-
signments. Section 4.2 provides additional context on the problem; section 4.3 presents an
integer program model; section 4.4 through 4.7 provide the main results on analyzing the
problem under different settings. We summarize all algorithms and heuristics in Section
C.1, proofs of the theorems and corollaries in Section C.2, and pseudocodes in Section C.5.
4.2 Literature
The concept of stable matching has been applied in many other areas recently, but most
research focuses on making decisions in a single-period. In the Gale-Shapely stable match-
ing model, members of two disjoint groups (e.g., workers and jobs) provide preferences for
being matched to members of the other group. A matching is stable when for any worker-
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job pair not currently matched, either the worker is assigned to a less preferred job, or the
job is assigned to a less preferred worker, or both. In a non-stable matching, there exists a
worker-job pair that blocks the current matching (called a blocking pair), in which both the
worker and the job in the new match are individually better off. The Gale-Shapely model
can be formulated as a linear program with a constraint requiring each worker-job pair to
be stable [69, 70].
Some common applications of the stable matching problem include matching doctors to
hospitals [71, 72], students to schools [73, 74, 75], kidneys to patients [76, 77], and tenants
to apartments or houses [78]. Although in general there could be many stable matchings
for a given preference list, many applications were studied under special preference lists
relevant to our research, where a unique stable matching exists [79].
Most research on stable matchings also focuses on a static setting, although there are
recent papers that address stability in a dynamic matching market. In these papers, stability
over multiple periods takes into account the changing preferences or utility [80, 81], or
agents from one side or both sides of the market arrive and exit over time [82, 83, 84].
Several researchers introduce different concepts of approximately stable matchings in a
single period (e.g., a matching is stable as long as members in the current match would not
be worse off by a certain measure) to find matchings with a higher social welfare [85, 86].
4.3 Problem definition
We consider assignments of a set of n workers, W , and a set of n jobs, J , over p periods.
An assignment is represented as a one-to-one correspondence M of the set of workers and
the set of jobs with n rows and n columns, where the entry (i, j) indicates the number of
periods worker i is assigned to job j. We use the notation [n] to denote the integer set
{1, ..., n}.
We assume workers have provided a list of jobs ranked in order of preference and jobs
also have a ranked ordering of workers. We also assume references are complete (worker
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either prefers j1 over j2 or j2 over j1) and transitive (if worker prefers job j1 over job j2
and prefers job j2 over job j3 then worker prefers job j1 over job j3). In addition, there are
no ties in the preference lists.
Similar to the Gale-Shapely stable matching model, we study assignments of jobs and
workers where stability is used for satisfying preferences. We assume that all worker and
job preferences are known in advance and that the set of workers and jobs do not change
over time, which is done similarly in [69, 70]. Thus we utilize a deterministic model for
studying stable matchings in the multi-period setting. In the following sections, we define
multi-period stability and objective function, and formulate the problem using an integer
program.
4.3.1 Multi-period (relaxed) stability
The multi-period stability for a worker-job pair (i, j) is defined as the number of times the
following condition is satisfied divided by the number of periods:
1. either worker i is assigned to a job better than job j,
2. or job j is assigned to a worker better than worker i, or
3. worker i is assigned to job j.
If the number of period is three and the above condition is satisfied two times for worker i
and job j, then the stability of worker-job pair (i, j) is 2
3
. To measure the overall stability of
the matching, we require that a minimum quantity α(0 ≤ α ≤ 1) be met for all worker-job
pairs. A multi-period matching is α-stable if the stability for each worker-job pair is at least
α.
We choose this definition because it is consistent with existing research that formulates
a single-period stable matching model as a linear program [69, 70]. When α = 0, the
stability constraint is redundant since every decision variable is non-negative. When α = 1,
we require each worker-job pair to be stable in all periods, which is equivalent to requiring
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a stable matching in each period. For a single period and α = 1, the multi-period stability
reduces to the stability constraint in [69].
Our definition aggregates individual stability constraints in each period and uses a pa-
rameter to indicate how much stability is required. The definition of multi-period stability
requires each worker-job pair, instead of the entire matching, to be stable in a certain num-
ber of periods, which can be viewed as a natural extension of the definition of single-period
stability. As a result, an α-stable matching can be achieved by combining a certain number
of stable and non-stable single-period matchings, or by combining non-stable matchings
only. Other studies have proposed alternative definitions that are more complex, emphasize
on different characteristics of the multi-period setting, and often do not allow for different
stability.
Although α can be any real number between 0 to 1, it suffices to consider a limited
number of values, where αp is an integer. A single-period matching is either 0-stable (not
stable), or 1-stable (stable). Similarly, the multi-period stability of any worker-job pair in
a p-period matching can only take values from i
p
, i ∈ [p]. Therefore, assignments to a








, i ∈ [p]. For example, if p = 3, then it is sufficient to only consider α






Organizations may be interested in considering the utility for each worker-job pair, which
depends on the position of job in the preference list of worker. Since we are interested in
balancing the desired and undesired assignments across workers over multiple periods, we
utilize an objective function that is similar to the min-max regret concept introduced in [3].
We further assume that every worker-job pair applies the same utility function according to
the stated preference lists.
For each worker-job pair (i, j), we apply a utility function ukij in each period k and
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maximize the minimum individual utility summed over all periods. The utility function ukij
is a function on the position of job j in the preference list of worker i. More specifically,
for worker-job pairs (i1, j1) in period k1 and (i2, j2) in period k2, if job j1 and j2 are both




where f(r) : N+ → N+ ∪ {0} and f is non-increasing in r.
4.3.3 Formulation
We formulate the multi-period stable matching problem with a max-min utility objective,
as outlined in Formulation 2. For all workers i ∈ [n], jobs j ∈ [n], and periods k ∈ [p], we
define the necessary notation, input, and decision variables in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Notation, input and decision variables in the multi-period stable matching for-
mulation.
W,J notation the set of workers and jobs, respectively
n, p notation the number of workers (jobs) and periods, respectively
p >Wi j notation worker i prefers job p to job j
p >Jj i notation job j prefers worker p to worker i
α input the requirement on the multi-period stability
uij input the utility measure for worker i if assigned to job j
xkij decision variable 1 if worker i is assigned to job j in period k, 0 otherwise
skij decision variable 1 if worker-job pair (i, j) is stable in period k, 0 otherwise
ui decision variable the individual utility of worker i summed over p periods
U decision variable the minimum individual utility
We apply a standard formulation trick to convert the convex objective function into a
linear objective function. The objective function (4.1), combined with constraints (4.6) and
(4.7), maximizes the minimum utility of workers summed over all periods. Constraint (4.2)
and (4.3) ensure that the assignment is a perfect matching (where every worker and job is
matched), and constraint (4.4) and (4.5) are the multi-period stability constraints.
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xkij = 1 ∀j ∈ [n], k ∈ [p] (4.2)
n∑
j=1
xkij = 1 ∀i ∈ [n], k ∈ [n] (4.3)






xkpj ∀i, j ∈ [n], k ∈ [p] (4.4)
p∑
k=1








ij ∀i ∈ [n] (4.6)
U ≤ si ∀i ∈ [n] (4.7)
xkij, s
k
ij ∈ {0, 1} ∀i, j ∈ [n],∀k ∈ [p] (4.8)
Consider the multi-period stability constraints in equations (4.4) and (4.5). When p = 1
and α = 1, these constraints reduce to the single-period stability constraint in the one-to-
one stable marriage problem formulation [70]. When p ≥ 2 and α = 1, an optimal solution
is to repeat the worker-optimal stable matching in all periods, since Formulation 2 only
measures the utility for workers. Both problems can be solved in polynomial time via
the Gale-Shapely algorithm. When α is 0, the multi-period stability constraints become
redundant and can be removed from the formulation, which is still hard to solve.
There are several differences between Formulation 2 and the formulation in [70].
1. Formulation 2 has a convex objective function that maximizes the minimum utility
over all workers, while the formulation in [70] has no utility assigned to each match-
ing and the objective function is to maximize the number of matchings,
2. the right hand side of constraint (4.5) is α instead of 1 when p = 1, and
3. we only consider perfect matchings (every worker and job is assigned) because we
assume complete preference lists.
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Notice that α is a right-hand side parameter of Formulation 2, and the objective function
value of the linear relaxation of Formulation 2 is concave on α. In other words, the objective
function value decreases as α increases, and the rate of decrease is higher under larger alpha
values. As greater stability is required, there is a larger impact on the quality of assignment
from workers’ perspective.
4.3.4 Vertical heterogeneity
The integer program we formulate in section 4.3.3 can be solved for any specific prefer-
ence list for workers and jobs, and multiple optimal solutions can exist. However, there
exists several preference lists of particular interest. In a paper by Eeckhout [79], the au-
thor describes the following two extreme cases of preference lists and their foundations in
practical applications.
1. Vertical heterogeneity, where all jobs have the same preferences over workers (e.g.,
a strict ranking of army officers based on standard scoring systems or the test scores
of students) and all workers have the same preferences over jobs (e.g., the location
of the job or ranking of universities).
2. Horizontal heterogeneity, where all workers (jobs) have different preferences over
jobs (workers) , but each worker (job) has a different most preferred job (worker) and
in addition is the most preferred by that job (worker).
Workers with similar background or skills usually have preference lists that are similar to
vertical heterogeneity, where workers and jobs have identical preference lists. On the other
hand, when the background of workers are more diversified, their preference lists could be
more similar to horizontal heterogeneity.
We are particularly interested in the vertical heterogeneity preference list, as similar
preference lists arise naturally in practice. For example, the WFP have “hard” jobs (e.g., a
job based in Afghanistan) that are generally not preferred by anyone, and “easy” jobs that
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are preferred by everyone (e.g., a job based in Rome, Italy). The preference lists of workers
are expected to be similar, and they list the “easy” jobs at the top of their preference lists in
each period. Under such preference structures, requiring assignments to be stable in each
period may not always be desirable, because workers at the bottom of jobs’ preference lists
could be assigned to their least preferred jobs in all periods.
On the other hand, the problem is easy to solve under horizontal heterogeneity: the
optimal solution is to assign workers their first choices in every period for any stability
requirement. Clearly the objective function value is better under horizontal heterogeneity.
Therefore, we focus on solving the multi-period stable matching problem under vertical
heterogeneity, where relaxing stability improves the objective function value.
4.3.5 Other special preference lists
The vertical heterogeneity preference list also exhibit other interesting properties. More
specifically, both vertical and horizontal heterogeneity preference lists are special cases of
the Sequential Preference Conditions (SPC) preference lists, which are sufficient conditions
for the uniqueness of a stable matching. The SPC is defined as follows in [79] and [87].
∀ worker k and job s, worker k prefers job k over job s as long as s > k. (4.9)
∀ job k and worker s, job k prefers worker k over worker s as long as s > k. (4.10)
In other words, workers (jobs) prefer jobs (workers) in the same rank order to jobs (work-
ers) below the workers’(jobs’) own rank order. For preference lists satisfying the above
conditions, we can make a recursive argument beginning from assigning the highest ranked
worker and job to each other, and any other matchings will be blocked by the identity
matching (the matching where workers are matched to jobs with the same rank orders). As
a result, the unique stable matching is to assign worker k to job k,∀k ∈ [n].
The uniqueness of stable matching is sometimes desirable for analysis of truth-telling
47
in mechanism design. In a single-period setting with full stability required, workers and
jobs can report preferences different from their actual preferences. Then, truth-telling by
all workers and jobs is a Nash equilibrium if and only if there is a unique stable matching
based upon actual preferences [87]. In addition, Ehlers [88] notices that the NRMP has very
few stable matchings, implying that the submitted preferences could be close to satisfy the
SPC conditions.
We primarily assume that preference lists of workers and jobs satisfy vertical hetero-
geneity and stay the same over time. In subsequent analysis, we consider dynamic pref-
erence lists with vertical heterogeneity in section 4.6. We also indicate under what other
preference lists our results hold in section 4.7.
4.4 Analytical results under vertical heterogeneity
There are several characteristics of vertical heterogeneity and the preference lists staying
the same that can be utilized in analyzing the problem in depth. Under these assumptions,
we make observations that help us to obtain an upper bound on the objective function
value. In addition, we study the structure of optimal solution using a greedy algorithm that
determines the upper bound. Furthermore, we implement the integer program developed in
section 4.3.3 under a special utility function. We show that the integer program can only
provide solutions in reasonable amount of time for small size problems, emphasizing the
need for developing fast heuristics.
4.4.1 Upper bound
We first make several observations on vertical heterogeneity that could help us to obtain an
upper bound on the objective function value.
1. When the preference lists stay the same over time, we can simplify the notation of
utility as ukij = uij,∀k ∈ [p]. When preference lists are identical, the unique stable
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matching is the identity matching, and the utility function can be further simplified
as uij = uj,∀i ∈ [n].
2. If α = 1, worker k will be assigned to job k in all periods ∀k ∈ [n], giving an
objective function value p ·un. This is the minimum value that the objective function
can achieve under any preference list.



























We exploit these properties to find an upper bound on the optimal objective function
value, where the bound depends on α.
Theorem 1. Given n ≥ 2, p ≥ 2 and α ∈ (0, 1), an upper bound on the optimal solution
can be found by a greedy algorithm, where the upper bound depends on n, p and α.
We design Algorithm 1 that iteratively assigns jobs to a subset of workers in order
of their ranking orders in jobs’ preference lists. This algorithm exploits observation 3
(equation 4.11) and satisfies stability requirements for each worker-job pair using minimal
utility.
In each iteration, Algorithm 1 assigns one worker αp times to his or her unique stable
matches, then assigns jobs with the least utility to the current worker in the other periods to
maximize what is left for the unassigned workers. At the end of each iteration, we calculate
the average remaining utility by taking the total utility of unassigned jobs and divide it by
the number of unassigned workers, and we compare the individual utility of the current
worker and the average remaining utility of unassigned workers. The stopping criteria is
when the current worker has a lower utility than the average remaining utility.
We show that the final average remaining utility is an upper bound on the objective
function value and the maximum number of iterations of Algorithm 1 is at most n. The
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number of workers assigned in Algorithm 1 depends on α. If α = 0, no workers is assigned;
if α = 1, all workers are assigned to their unique stable matching in all p periods. In
general, more workers are assigned by Algorithm 1 for larger alpha values.
The structure of the assignments from Algorithm 1 also provides insight on the structure
of optimal solutions. Suppose for a given problem with α stability, the number of workers
assigned by Algorithm 1 is k∗. We show in Theorem 2 that the assignments of the first k∗
workers in any optimal solution share the same structure.
Theorem 2. For any n ≥ 2, p ≥ 2 and α ∈ (0, 1), an optimal assignment M can be
transformed into another optimal solution M ′ such that workers k, k ∈ [k∗] are assigned
the same as in Algorithm 1. The transformation algorithm terminates in O(n2p) steps.
We describe this algorithm in details in section C.1. The intuition of Algorithm 2 comes
from that Algorithm 1 assigns the first k∗ workers using jobs of minimal utility, so any other
optimal solution with a different assignment will only provide less utility for the remaining
workers, leaving the potential of improvement on the objective function value. Algorithm
2 identifies workers among the first k∗ with excessive utilities and switches jobs with high
utility to the rest of workers while maintaining stability for all pairs. Using these results,
we prove that the multi-period stable matching problem is NP-hard when preference lists
are identical under mild assumptions on the utility function (see section C.2.3 for details).
We also show that there exist special cases for which the problem is solved in polynomial
time.
4.4.2 Reverse rank utility function and integer program performance
The min-max regret objective is widely used as an outcome measure in other research of
stable matchings in a single period [89, 5, 86]. When worker i is matched with job j,
the regret of worker i is defined as the position (or rankings) of job j in the preference
list of worker i, and vise versa. The regret of the matching is the maximum regret over
all workers and jobs and the max-min regret objective balances the quality of matching
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from the perspective of both workers and jobs. In our research, we define the utility uk
of job k, similar to regret, as the reverse rank of job k on workers’ preference list: uk =
n− k + 1,∀k ∈ [n]. We assume reverse rank utility for the rest of this chapter.
The computational time of the integer program varies with the number of workers
and jobs, the stability required, and the structure of the preference lists. We implement
Formulation 2 under vertical heterogeneity and reverse rank utility in CPLEX. The prob-
lem can be easy to solve under certain assumptions, such as when α = 1. However, for
n = 30, p = 3, α = 2
3
, and the preference lists are vertical heterogeneous, the problem took
more than six hours to find an optimal solution. Furthermore when the number of workers
and jobs are more than 100, the integer program usually does not find a solution within
10% of the optimal value under one hour.
As a result of the integer program performance, we turn towards other algorithms and
heuristics for finding solutions within reasonable time. The analytical results also allow us
to make certain guarantees on the performance of the algorithms and heuristics.
4.5 Heuristics under vertical heterogeneity and reverse rank utility
4.5.1 Properties when stability is low (approximately 1
2
or less)
For most practical problems, it may be desirable to have larger alpha values in order to
satisfy preference. However, we first consider the solution and its structure for smaller
alpha values, as this provides a building block for solving problems under larger alpha
values.
More specifically, we focus on when α ≤ bp/2c
p





; for odd number of periods, requiring α ≤ 1
2
is equivalent to requiring α ≤ bp/2c
p
.
We obtain an optimal solution for α = bp/2c
p
and show that the optimal value does not
change when α decreases from bp/2c
p
to 0. In other words, we get α = bp/2c
p
“for free”. The
solution approach is summarized as Algorithm 3.
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Theorem 3. Under vertical heterogeneity, α ≤ 1
2
and the utility of job k is uk = n −
k + 1,∀k ∈ [n], the optimal solution to the multi-period stable matching problem can be
obtained in O(n) steps.
To understand what is driving the objective function value, we first consider the case
when α = 0. For any assignment, the stability constraints are satisfied for all worker-job
pairs and the problem reduces to maximizing the minimum worker utility over multiple
periods. Since workers have the same preference lists in all periods, job k will always
provide a utility of n− k+1 regardless of the assignment. Therefore, the total utility stays




n− k + 1 = pn(n+ 1)
2
. (4.12)
To maximize the minimum worker utility, ideally every worker should have the same
utility p(n+1)
2
. This objective value can be achieved easily when the number of periods is
even: for all workers k ∈ [n], assign worker k to job k in half of the periods and to job
n− k + 1 in the other half. The total utility gained for any worker k in this assignment is:
p
2
(n− k + 1) + p
2
(n− (n− k + 1) + 1) = p(n+ 1)
2
. (4.13)
Since in the unique stable matching, job k is assigned to worker k for all k ∈ [n], the
stability of this solution is 1
2
. The details for when the number of periods is odd can be
found in section C.1.
4.5.2 Properties when stability is high (approximately 1
2
or more)
For higher values of stability, we design different heuristics that exploit the structure of the
problem. Recall that it is sufficient to analyze alpha values with αp integral. Therefore for
1
2
< α ≤ 3
4
, we can assume p ≥ 3.
We design Heuristic 1 with assignments in αp periods responsible for satisfying the
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required stability and in the other (1 − α)p periods improving the objective value. From
Algorithm 1, the stability constraints are the most restrictive for workers that are “popular”
among jobs. As a result, the objective function values are often driven by workers that are
“unpopular” among jobs. We design heuristics to first satisfy the stability of pairs involving
“popular” workers using minimal utility, then improve the individual utility of “unpopular”
workers in other periods. More specifically, we divide workers into two sets (the number












for α > 3
4
) and provide different
assignment approaches for workers in each set.
Theorem 4. Under vertical heterogeneity for any p ≥ 3 and 1
2
< α ≤ 3
4
, Heuristic 1 gives
an α-stable assignment.





are assigned to their unique stable





in the remaining (1 − α)p











. However, we still need an additional (α − (1 − α))p = (2α − 1)p periods of





. We assign worker
k to job k in (2α − 1)p of the periods, and in the rest of periods we improve the utilities





using similar procedures as in Algorithm 3.
We develop a constructive heuristic (Heuristic 2) for α > 3
4
similar to Heuristic 1,
except that the number of workers assigned similarly to the first half of workers in Heuristic





and depends on α. We also develop Heuristic 3 that improves the
objective function value iteratively, although without theoretical performance guarantees.
4.5.3 Heuristic performance
To measure the theoretical performance of Heuristic 1 and 2, and the computational per-
formance of all heuristics, we calculate the upper bound on the objective value for any
given n, α, and p using Algorithm 1. We also obtain a closed form upper bound when n is
sufficiently large (≥ 100).
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Theorem 5. If n ≥ 2, p ≥ 3, α > 1
2
, and the utility of job k is the reverse rank uk =
n − k + 1, then the upper bound on the optimal value as the number of agents n goes to
infinity is:
UB(α) = (1− α)2 +
√
α(1− α)(3α− α2 − 1). (4.14)
Figure 4.1 shows the computation of UB(α) from Theorem 5. The upper bound UB(α)
decreases as α increases, and is concave in α when n goes to infinity. This result is consis-
tent with our analysis on the objective function value of the linear relaxation of the problem.
The actual optimal value may not have the same shape as the decision variables are discrete.
α































Upper bound vs. α
Figure 4.1: Upper bound value for each α (normalized by the number of workers and jobs
n and the number of periods p)
With calculations of the upper bound, we quantify the theoretical performance of Heuris-
tic 1 in Corollary 6 and Heuristic 2 in Theorem 7.
Corollary 6 (Performance of Heuristic 1). With sufficiently large n (≥ 100), for any p ≥ 3
and 1
2
< α ≤ 3
4
, Heuristic 1 gives a solution that is at least 88% optimal.
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Theorem 7 (Performance of Heuristic 2). Let ustm(α) be the minimum utility among all







UB(α) + 1/(2p) + 1− α
}
. (4.15)
The heuristic gives a solution that is at least 73% optimal.
The worst-case theoretical and computational performance of Heuristics 1 and 2 are
shown in Figure 4.2 when the number of workers and jobs ranges from 990 to 1010, the
number of periods ranges from 3 to 50, and for every α where αp is an integer. The worst-
case computational performance for Heuristic 3 is shown in Figure 4.3.
The theoretical and computational gaps are similar for Heuristic 1, but are different
for Heuristic 2. The difference is bigger when the number of periods is large (≥ 10) and
smaller when the number of periods is small. Notice that when the number of period is
sufficiently large, the optimal solution can be approximated by solving its linear relaxation.
This could explain why the performance of Heuristic 2 is better when the number of periods
is larger for the same α.
Similarly for Heuristic 3, the computational performance is generally better when the
number of periods is larger, but the optimality gap never exceeds 3%. Although Heuristic
3 gives much better computational performance under certain cases, the computation time
is longer. In addition, Heuristic 3 only applies when workers and jobs have identical pref-
erence lists, while at the end of this paper we are able to generalize the other two heuristics
and apply to other preference lists.
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Figure 4.2: Combined performance of Heuristic 1 and 2 compared to upper bound
Figure 4.3: Computational performance of Heuristic 3.
4.6 Workers’ preference lists change over time
An important setting not captured by Formulation 2 is when worker preferences change
over time. Certain companies (General Electric [90]), organizations (The World Food Pro-
gram) and the NRMP establish job rotation programs, in which workers, employees, or
doctors have the incentive to change their preference lists over time. These rotation pro-
grams are usually limited to a few years as the ability of individuals to think over many
time periods is limited from the well known concept of bounded rationality [91]. Studies
that address preference list dynamics (although without studying the trade-offs between
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stability and quality of matchings) usually do not solve the problem in full generality [80,
81].
We consider a special case of a generally changing preference list, driven by cases when
jobs can be used to acquire skill sets. We refer the problem when preference lists change
over time “the dynamic problem” and the case when workers’ preference lists stay the same
over time “the static problem”. We assume vertical heterogeneity on the initial preference
lists and the dynamic of preference lists is the same for all workers. All other assumptions
for the static problem hold true for the dynamic problem.
4.6.1 Dynamic problem definition
We focus on the case when all workers prefer jobs they have not been assigned over jobs
they have already been assigned. Let the number of workers and jobs be n and the number
of periods be p. We summarize the dynamic of preference lists in each period for a worker
as follows.
1. In period one, workers are given a specific preference list (identical preference lists).
Let the current period be q = 1.
2. If worker k is assigned to job s in period q, then in period q + 1 job s becomes the
least preferred job of worker k. The relative rank orders of jobs other than s in worker
k’s preference list in period q + 1 is the same as in period q.
3. In any period, the utility of a job with rank order k is n− k+1 (reverse rank utility).
Although the preference lists change in the same way for all workers, they will be dif-
ferent for each worker at the end of each period. As a result, whether a worker-job pair
becomes a blocking pair in a specific period does not depend on assignments in other pe-
riods. Therefore, the assignment matrix representation in the static problem is no longer
adequate as there is ambiguity on whether pairs are blocking a matching or not. We in-
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troduce another assignment matrix N with p rows (periods) and n columns (jobs), and the
(i, j) entry of N indicating the index of job worker j is assigned to in period i.
Many of the results in this section extend to the case when an entire group of jobs moves
to the bottom of the preference lists after workers are assigned to only one job within the
group. See section C.4 for further discussion.
4.6.2 Dynamic problem formulation
The dynamic problem can be easy to solve when the number of periods is one or two. When
p = 1, the dynamic problem is equivalent to the static problem and any solution is optimal.
When p = 2, an optimal solution is to assign the worker-optimal matching in period one,
then assign jobs with higher utility to workers with lower utility in period two.
We formulate an integer program for the three-period dynamic problem using exponen-
tial number of if-then constraints. The detailed description of the formulation can be found
in section C.3. We implement the dynamic formulation in CPLEX and are able to solve the
problem with n ≤ 9, p = 3 and α = 2
3
to optimality under one hour. For problems with
more than 20 workers and jobs, the integer program usually does not find a solution within
10% of the optimal value.
It is possible to formulate an integer program for problems with more periods, but the
number of variables and constraints needed is extremely large. We focus our study on three
periods, as dynamic problems with more periods provide limited (additional) insights for
understanding the structure of the dynamic problem.
4.6.3 Heuristics for the dynamic problem
Since the dynamic integer program formulation does not provide solutions under reason-
able time, we solve the three-period dynamic problem by modifying Algorithm 3 for α = 1
3
and Heuristic 1 for α = 2
3
. To account for the changes in workers’ preference lists, we spec-
ify the assignments in each period (e.g., “assign worker k to job k in period one and two”
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instead of ”assign worker k to job k” two times). Since both Algorithm 3 and Heuristic
1 assign jobs in either descending or ascending order of the index of workers during each
step, the only modification needed is to update workers’ preference lists after each period.
In section C.1 we outline Heuristic 4 for α ≤ 1
3
and Heursitic 5 for 1
3
< α ≤ 2
3
. The
modified heuristics could be used to solve for when α ≤ 3
4
and p ≥ 4 under minor changes,
but not when α > 3
4
as Heuristic 1 applies only to when α ≤ 3
4
. In this case, we conjecture
that similar heuristics could be developed by further modifying Heuristic 2.
4.6.4 Dynamic problem computational performance
To measure the performance of the dynamic heuristics, we find an upper bound on the
objective function value that does not depend on α by utilizing the structure of dynamic
preference lists. In addition, we implement heuristics for the dynamic problem and com-
pare their performance with the upper bound for the dynamic problem.
Jobs with lower utility in period one could provide more utility in later periods, espe-
cially when assigned to workers who have already been assigned to higher utility jobs in
previous periods. When workers have identical preference lists, we obtain an upper bound
on the optimal value by computing the maximum potential utility of each job in each period
and taking the average maximum potential utility over all periods and jobs.
Theorem 8. Let Umax(j, t) be the maximum potential utility of job j in period t, then
Umax(j, t) = min{n, n− j + t}, (4.16)












We expect the upper bound UBdy to be larger than the optimal objective function value
in general. This is more likely to be true when α > 1
2
because for the static problem, the
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upper bound decreases as α increases beyond 1
2
.
UsingUBdy as an upper bound, we analyze the computational performance of heuristics
for the dynamic problem. For n from 1 to 100 and p = 3, we compute the objective values
of Heuristic 4 with α = 1
3
and Heuristic 5 with α = 2
3
, and compare these results to the
dynamic problem upper bound UBdy and the objective value of the static Heuristic 1 with
α = 2
3
in Figure 4.4. We make several observations from Figure 4.4.
1. In both heuristics, the objective function value increases roughly linearly with the
number of workers and jobs n, as well as the upper bound. Furthermore, the opti-
mality gap of the heuristics appears to be converging to a constant as the number of
workers and jobs grows.
2. The performance of the dynamic heuristic for α = 1
3
(Heuristic 4) is close to the
dynamic upper bound. In fact, the absolute gap between the heuristic performance
and the upper bound is a constant 2. We expect the absolute gap stays constant when
the number of jobs increases, and the percentage gap converges to 0 as n→∞.
3. The dynamic heuristic for α = 2
3
(Heuristic 5) returns a slightly higher objective
function value compared to the static heuristic for α = 2
3
(Heuristic 1), which is
expected because jobs in the dynamic problem generally provides more utility in
later periods. The percentage gap between the heuristic performance and the dynamic
upper bound is 17%. For the static problem, the theoretical optimality gap is 10%
because the static upper bound depends on α. It is reasonable to expect the actual
optimal value to decrease as α increases for the dynamic problem. Therefore, the
heuristic performance gap could be smaller than appears.
In our computational results, the number of periods is small compared to the number of
workers and jobs. As a result, the relative difference between the workers’ preference lists
in the static and dynamic problems is expected to be small. The optimality gap is expected
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Figure 4.4: Computational results for Heuristic 4 and 5.
to grow as the number of periods increase, because the dynamic upper bound does not
depend on α.
4.7 General preference lists
Vertical heterogeneity is an extreme case of preference lists and in practice the preference
lists of workers and jobs may not be identical. In this section we extend our analysis to
a more general set of preference lists, where a unique stable matching exists in a single
period problem. For the static and dynamic problems, we identify conditions under which
the developed heuristics will return an α-stable solution. We provide insights on the neces-
sity of these conditions and relate them to the literature. In addition, we comment on the
computational performance of the heuristics under these preference lists. We only discuss
the case when α > 1
2
as in practice higher stability is desired, and leave the discussion of
other cases in the Appendix.
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4.7.1 The static problem
We focus on the case when 1
2
< α ≤ 3
4
and analyze the proof of Heuristic 1, which uses
conditions that are less restrictive than vertical heterogeneity to show each worker-job pair
achieves α-stability. We summarize the conditions and their implications for Heuristic 1 to
return an α-stable assignment below.





, worker k is assigned to job k at least αp times
1. For s ≤ k, job s prefers worker s to worker k: the stability of pair (k, s) is
greater than α.
2. For s > k, all workers prefer jobs with higher utility than s to jobs with lower
utilities than k: the stability of pair (k, s) is greater than α.
















∧ s ≤ k, job s is assigned to worker s at least (2α − 1)p times.
Therefore the stability of pair (k, s) is (1− α) + (2α− 1) = α.
2. For s > k, worker k is assigned to at least (1 − α + 2α − 1)p = αp jobs that
have higher utilities than job s. Therefore, the stable-level of pair (k, s) is at
least α.
We notice that vertical heterogeneity is a special case to the above conditions used in the
proof of Theorem 4. As a result, Heuristic 1 can return an α-stable solution for a broader set
of preference lists, which is a subset of the SPC conditions. We summarize these conditions
in Corollary 9.
Corollary 9. Heuristic 1 returns an α-stable solution if the following conditions on work-
ers’ and jobs’ preference lists hold:
1. ∀k ∈ [n], worker k prefers job k to all jobs s, s > k,
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+ 1 ≤ t ≤ n.
Proof. Immediately from the proof of Theorem 4.
Conditions 1 and 2 in Corollary 9 are exactly the sufficient conditions SPC. This is
not surprising since Heuristic 1 is partially symmetric along the identical matching, which
represents the unique stable assignment under SPC. These assignments are responsible for
satisfying stability for many worker-job pairs. Condition 3 requires workers with lower




separating the two sets. Notice that requiring the preference lists of the second half of
workers to be identical is a special case of condition 3, which reflects the situation where
half of the jobs is clearly better than the other half in workers’ preference lists.
The set of preference lists for which Heuristic 2 returns a stable matching is similar
to the conditions in Corollary 9, replacing the third condition by: ∀k > n − x, worker k
prefers all jobs s, 1 ≤ s ≤ n−x to all jobs t, n−x+1 ≤ t ≤ n. Notice that this condition





), which decreases as α increases.
We also observe that for arbitrary job preference lists, we can obtain condition 2 by
reordering the workers’ indexes. Suppose workers and jobs are indexed from 1 to n. We
define the favorite worker of job 1 as worker w1, and subsequently define worker wk as the
favorite worker of job k, excluding workers w1 to wk−1. We then reorder the workers from
w1 to wn and reflect the new ordering in the preferences lists of jobs. Workers’ preference
lists stay the same, but the resulting jobs’ preference lists now satisfy condition 2. A similar
argument can be made for arbitrary worker preference lists, where we obtain condition 1
by reordering the jobs’ indexes.
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4.7.2 The dynamic problem
We focus on the case when 1
3
< α ≤ 2
3
for a three periods problem and analyze the
set of preference lists under which heuristics for the dynamic problem returns α-stable
assignments. Results for the dynamic problem are similar, but the set of preference lists
we can generalize is more restricted. More specifically, Heuristic 5 returns an α-stable
solutions for a broader set of preference lists related to the SPC condition, specified in
Corollary 10.
Corollary 10. Heuristic 5 provides an α-stable assignment if the following conditions on




































even, job k prefers worker k − 1 to all workers s, s > k.
In addition, conditions (4.9) and (4.10) hold.
Proof. Immediately from the proof of Theorem 14.
Condition 1 is the same as condition 3 in Corollary 9, which is expected as both of
the heuristics put an effort to improve the utility of workers with lower ranked orders.
Condition 2 and 3 are the results of avoiding identical assignments in the heuristics. For
example, if worker 1 is assigned to job 1 in period one, then by condition 2 worker 1 is
assigned to job 2 in period two. Without this condition, worker 1 would not necessarily
prefer job 2 to all other jobs in period two, which is essential to maintain stability for all
pairs (1, k), k ≥ 3 in period two. Similarly for job 1, condition 3 maintains the stability for
all pairs (k, 1), k ≥ 3.
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To solve the dynamic problem with higher number of periods and larger α, we expect
that making similar modifications to the static heuristics is sufficient. However, as the
number of periods grows, workers’ preference lists will be less likely to satisfy the SPC
conditions and more conditions will be needed (eventually the preference lists all converge
to vertical heterogeneity as the number of periods increases).
In the proofs of Algorithm 3 and Heuristic 1, 2, 4 and 5, we prove that the objective
function value returned under each heuristic can be only higher compared to when workers
have identical preference lists. Therefore, we expect the computational results be better
under these more general preference lists.
4.8 Conclusions
We study the multi-period assignment problem under complete preference lists, no ties, and
relaxed stability. Our paper contributes to the discussion of assigning jobs to workers over
time, which is part of the regular operations for many organizations such as the World Food
Program, Navy, and the National Residency Matching Program. We address the problem
in a two-sided market under complete preference lists and no ties, where the preference of
workers either stay the same or change over time.
In particular, we extend stability to a multi-period setting where organizations need to
make assignments that are stable and of good quality, for which existing literature often
does not simultaneously account. We formulate an integer program model and develop
heuristics that are fast and of good computational performance, and we provide insights on
the trade-offs between requiring assignments with higher stability and higher quality.
In the first part of our paper, we study the theoretical aspects of the problem under a
special preference list vertical heterogeneity. We analyze the structure of optimal solutions
and provide an upper bound on the objective value using a greedy procedure. We exploit the
structure of the assignment from this greedy procedure and show that a special case of the
multi-period stable matching problem is equivalent to the well known partition problem.
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In the second part of our paper, we provide constructive heuristics that are fast and easy
to implement. We solve the problem with large number of agents and small number of
periods using these heuristics. When workers’ preference lists stay the same over time and
are identical, the best theoretical performance is within 27% of the optimal value and the
best computational performance is within 3% of the optimal value. We also extend our
analysis to when workers’ preference lists are ”rotating” based on previous assignments,
where worker will rank his or her last assignment as the least favorite job in the current
period. We provide modified heuristics for solving the dynamic problem when p = 3,
achieving 83% optimality.
At the end of the paper, we generalize the heuristics for other sets of preference lists.
These preference lists are subsets of, or closely related to, the sufficient conditions for
uniqueness of stable matching. For the static problem, our heuristics can provide practical
instructions in assigning workers to jobs over multiple periods for a rich set of preference
lists. Under the dynamic problem when our assumptions are applicable, our heuristics can
also be implemented for providing practical guidelines to rotate workers through jobs over
time.
We exploit the structure of heuristics and provide guidelines and for developing solution
approaches under other settings. For workers at the top of jobs’ preference lists, their
stability requirements are more constraining. We generally satisfy stability related to these
workers using as little utility as possible. Workers at the bottom of jobs’ preference lists
usually drive the objective function value, as we want to maximize the minimum individual
utility. Fortunately, the stability requirements related to these workers are relatively easy to
satisfy. We propose several approaches for balancing individual utilities with limited jobs
of good quality.
Our research develops a framework to study the multi-period stable matching problem
and considers solution approaches for varies practical settings. We provide analytical and
computational results under these settings and provide insights and guidelines for prac-
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The thesis studies three practical problems that allocate resources to people with different
kinds of preferences. We study each problem using mathematical models and focus on
understanding the implications of people’s preferences in decision making. Our research
demonstrates how optimization models are used for incorporating various types of prefer-
ences and provides insights for designing practical and implementable tools for problems
arise from complex systems.
In the first problem, we compare optimization methods to catchment methods in mea-
suring the spatial access of patients, where the preferences of patients can be driven by
distance, congestion (waiting time), and other factors such as income and insurance type.
Specifically, we present decentralized optimization that assign patients to healthcare providers
with an objective function to minimize total distance traveled and weighted congestion ex-
perienced by patients, using Nash equilibrium constraints to incorporate choices of patients.
The catchment methods using analogy of gravity to model the attractiveness of healthcare
providers to patients, and measure patient-to-provider ratios for each patient. We compare
these two approaches analytically and using a case study to demonstrate the advantages of
the optimization methods, which include
1. capturing the experience of patients instead of the opportunities,
2. having the flexibility to accommodate additional constraints, and
3. recognizing the system cascading effect under congestion.
The optimization models can be used to measure health access at different levels of details,
and help decision makers to target areas with low access for potential intervention. To help
researchers not familiar with the concept of optimization, we implement the decentralized
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optimization models using AMPL, which is an open access software language. In addition,
we provide instructions and guidelines for submitting computer codes and utilizing the
online NEOS Solvers for solving the optimization models, so that practitioners and analysts
who are not familiar with the techniques can utilize the methods we have developed. We
publish the research, which is available online, in a journal that is oriented towards the
health services research community [1].
In the second problem, we demonstrate the need for information visibility in the public
health supply chain when it comes to allocating flu vaccines in limited supply. Usually,
vaccines are distributed to each location proportional to population, because public poli-
cies need to be transparent and fair. However, vaccine uptake rates are often different
across geographical locations, due to differences in supply chain, socio-economic status,
and personal beliefs.
We implement an agent-based simulation model (using C++) to capture the geograph-
ical aspects of the problem, especially the different uptake rates and commuting between
population groups. The agent-based simulation model also allows us to capture the geo-
graphical spread of the disease and the variance in flu cases under different realizations
of the pandemic. We compare strategies with (Population-and-inventory-based, or PIB)
and without (Population-based, or PB) vaccine inventory information under the simulation
framework with different parameter settings.
We find that under the PIB strategy with realistic parameters, there are fewer infec-
tions, more administered vaccine, less leftover vaccine, and higher service levels. States
often have vaccine registry systems in placed for tracking immunization records, especially
for children. The PIB strategy can potentially be implemented in the future, as the benefit of
the PIB strategy outweighs the potential cost to track inventory levels at each location. Our
geographically detailed simulation allows us to demonstrate the value of inventory infor-
mation, showing state, local, and federal agencies the benefit of tracking location of vaccine
administration. Moreover, our simulation can be expanded to incorporate other elements of
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vaccine allocation. For example, decision makers could use the inventory information from
the registry to target educational efforts to increase uptake of vaccine, further reducing the
number of infections and the amount of leftover vaccine. The research has been submitted
for publication, with a focus on disseminating our results to practitioners.
In the third problem, we study the multi-period matching problem under complete pref-
erence lists, no ties, and relaxed stability. This problem addresses assignments of workers
and jobs over time, which occurs regularly in organizations such as the World Food Pro-
gram (WFP), the Navy, and in the National Medical Residency Program (NRMP). We
address the case where preferences of workers stay the same over time, along with a model
that incorporates preferences of workers rotating based on past assignments.
We provide an integer formulation with the objective function maximizing the mini-
mum individual utility summed over periods and the multi-period stability constraint ag-
gregating the stability constraints in each individual period. Our formulation studies the
trade-offs between requiring a higher stability and a higher quality of assignments. We
use a parameter α to indicate how stable a multi-period assignment is, which allows us
to provide different assignments under applications with different requirement on stability
or quality. Moreover, we provide solution approaches that are fast and with good compu-
tational performance under a special preference list, which represents a typical practical
setting where assignments with good quality is hard to obtain.
We exploit the structure of these approaches and provide insights for generalizing our
results to other cases, with the preference lists of the workers either staying the same or
changing over time. Two organizations could potentially apply our work in their operations:
the Navy and the World Food Program (WFP). For the Navy, each officer is ranked based
on his or her performance on the current position and past experience, where the preference
lists of each position can be arbitrary. We show that in this case we can apply our heuristics
directly if officers submit complete preference lists and have no ties in their preference
lists. For the World Food Program, we suggest staff on the top of jobs’ preference lists are
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assigned enough preferred positions to satisfy stability. Then the WFP can negotiate with
the staff members and let them take less preferred positions in other periods, leaving more
preferred jobs to other workers to improve the quality of assignments. Our study potentially
provide new directions for future research on multi-period stable matching, such as the
study of incomplete preference lists, preferences with ties, etc.
In situations where centralized planners make decisions for the entire system, the so-
lution can be very efficient. However, many real-life problems involve individual decision
makers, and their preferences have to be taken into account. In this thesis we have fo-
cused on developing optimization and simulation models that incorporate preferences and
decision making. At the same time, we consider how the results and solution approaches
could be used to improve system efficiency and key objectives. This thesis has shown a few
examples (in the areas of health access, vaccine allocation, and job assignments) on how
to incorporate different preferences in consideration of system design, but there are still
many avenues left to explore. We hope that this thesis can potentially provide new ideas
and directions for future research in other areas, such as public health, supply chains, and






A.1 Parameter Selection and User Choice
In the optimization models, the congestion weight represents the trade-off between willing-
ness to travel and willingness to wait, and it may be adapted to different applications. To
identify a range of values that is reasonable for a given problem setting, we quantify several
measures of model performance across the network. Below we describe such performance
measures, provide the associated principles if applicable, and give calculation details for
the CF case.
• Congestion Difference for Close Facilities: Congestion at facilities that are very
close to each other should be similar. We quantify the absolute value of the difference
of each pair of facilities within 50 miles of each other, and sum up the differences
over the network.
• Distance Difference (or Congestion Difference) for Close Patients: Cost experienced
by patients who are very close to each other should be similar. We calculate the
variance in distance or congestion across individual visits originating in the same
county and sum the values over the network.
• Variance in Distance (or Congestion) across Network: Heterogeneous networks usu-
ally have some disparities in costs experienced; however, very extreme values may
not be reasonable. We quantify the mean distance traveled (or congestion experi-
enced) for visits within a county, then we calculate the variance across the counties
in the network.
• Distance Greater than Shortest Distance: Distance traveled by patients should not
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be much greater than their shortest possible distances. Distance to closest facility is
compared to average distance traveled by each patient.
• Total Distance or Total Congestion: Calculated across a network by summing up the
distance traveled or congestion experienced for each visit to a facility. These two
measures are inversely related.
Figure A.1 shows the measures for the optimization models under different congestion
weights, where the values are normalized [0,1] across results from both models. For pa-
tients whose visits are uncovered, we do not include those visits in the calculation of dis-
tance or congestion. Note that when the congestion factor is 0, the decentralized optimiza-
tion is equivalent to the centralized optimization. In this case, the centralized optimization
assignment reduces to finding the shortest distance between patients and hospitals. The
far right corresponds to splitting congestion evenly among facilities. Thus, the total dis-
tance traveled increases with the congestion factor (although not by much), and the total
congestion decreases significantly with the congestion factor.
The figure also shows that as the congestion weight increases, the variance of conges-
tion across the network is decreasing, while the variance of distance across the network is
increasing. For a very small congestion factor, distance is very important in the assignment
to facilities, and thus facilities that are close to each other may have different levels of con-
gestion. Using the principles above, there should be some differences in congestion and
distance across the network, but not excessively large gaps, so we view congestion factors
of around 10 as the most reasonable for this setting. The results for the centralized model
with different congestion factors are also similar.
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Figure A.1: Overall performance measures for different parameter settings of congestion
for the decentralized optimization method for Cystic Fibrosis, with highlighted area of
recommended values.
A.2 Other Variations on Optimization Model
Capacity: Some providers or facilities may have limited resources. This can be introduced
by adding a capacity constraint to the basic model. Define cj = capacity for provider j.
The corresponding constraint is
n∑
i=1
xij ≤ cj,∀j ∈ [m]. (A.1)
Unmet Demand: If resources in the network are limited, it may not be possible to meet all
demand. In this case, the assignment constraint should be modified to ≤. In addition, to
ensure that as much demand is met as possible, one can add constraints to ensure that for
community i, the minimum service level requirement si is met, that is,
m∑
j=1
xij ≥ sivi,∀i = 1, . . . , n. (A.2)
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Alternatively, one can add a penalty to the objective function for all visits not assigned.
Willingness to Travel: If patients are located too far from providers, they may not be
as willing to travel to that provider. In the basic optimization model, the cost to travel
is linear with distance. By adjusting the distance values, one can make the cost to travel
nonlinear with distance, which represents a patient’s higher willingness to travel to close
distances. Particular adjustments can be chosen to match the weights of zones as used in
the catchment models.
Patient or Provider Types: Some providers choose not to accept Medicaid patients (or
limit how many they will accept), which can reduce the spatial access for those patients.
One way to represent this in the model is by creating separate assignment variables for
each patient type, and adding constraints to limit their assignment to providers with those
preferences [92]. This allows the optimization approach to incorporate the link between
affordability and spatial accessibility.
On the demand side, patients may have preferences for providers with certain charac-
teristics, e.g., children and their caregivers may desire providers focused on pediatric care.
One way to incorporate this is to adjust the travel cost to be relatively lower for providers
of the preferred characteristics. This example shows how the optimization model can in-
corporate acceptability [7] in the measurement of access. A similar approach (adjusting
distances) can be used to capture differences in patient mobility, e.g., for families with
automotive vehicles or not.
Objective Function: In the Method section we describe a model with an objective func-
tion that has a particular congestion cost. Many other variations on congestion are possible,
including linear with the number of visits at a facility, exponential with the number of visits,
or others. More generally, many variations on the objective function are possible.
Interventions: Decision variables can be added to optimization models to represent
whether or not a new facility should be located in a network at particular locations, whether
or by how much to increase capacity, or other interventions. The interventions can be
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designed to optimize the overall system performance or to reduce the disparities among
subpopulations.
A.3 Minimum cost network flow transformation for decentralized model
Decision Variables:
xij = the percentage of time that patients in location i visit facility j.
yjk = 1 if the kth visit is selected for facility j.
Parameters:
dij = distance between patient location i and facility j.
w(dij) = decay function value for distance dij .
vi = demand of patient location i.
Cj = capacity at facility j.
fk = k, the cost of marginal congestion for the kth visit.
α = congestion weight.
























yik,∀j ∈ [m] (A.5)
xij ≥ 0,∀i ∈ [n] and ∀j ∈ [m] (A.6)
yik ∈ [0, 1],∀i ∈ [n] and ∀j ∈ [m] (A.7)
A.4 Analytical Results: networks with overlapping areas
Result 4: Optimization models show higher accessibility in non-overlapping areas. It
can be difficult to understand model differences across complex networks like we study in
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section 2.3.2. Thus we analyze one more simulated system (shown in Figure A.2) that can
assist in making comparisons between the 2SFCA approaches and optimization models.
1. When the population density is homogeneous over the network:
Consider System I with two facilities, each with a population surrounding them in
a circle of radius R. The distance between the two facilities is also R, so some
population resides between both facilities. Define the decay function
w(dij) = e
−dij , 0 ≤ dij ≤ R. (A.8)
The density of the areas is 1 unit per square mile and the supply C is the same in each
facility. We will compare composite measures across the network in Figure A.2.
For 2FSCA the physician-to-population ratio at each facility is S = C
V




e−rrdrdθ denotes the number of visits. For the population inside the catch-





where r is the distance between the patient and the facility. For the population in






where r1 is the distance to the first facility and r2 is the distance to the second facility.
We also have
r1 + r2 ≤ R, and r1, r2 ≤ R, (A.11)
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Figure A.2: Systems I and II have populations distributed in circles around facility 1 and
2. In I, the density is 1 person per square mile, and in II the density is 1 and n per square
mile for the left and right circles, respectively. In I, the figure indicates the locations of
populations M and ε used in the calculations.
which implies that
2e−R ≤ e−r1 + e−r2 ≤ 2e−
R
2 . (A.12)
For the optimization models, we initially use a congestion weight such that patients

















For the population inside the catchment of only one facility, the patients congestion
is FPs = F . For the population in the overlapping catchment areas the congestion
experienced by each patient is FPo = F .
If a patient is inside a single circle, then the optimization model shows higher acces-
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sibility than the 2SFCA approaches since FPs = F < 1/S. This is true for larger
congestion weights if there is no decay function or if the congestion weights are
extreme. The result occurs because visits are over-counted in the 2SFCA methods,
while the optimization model is capturing the cost associated with user experience.
For patients in the overlapping areas, we find that which method estimates higher
accessibility depends on the value of radius R. If R < ln(4/3), then the accessibility











which implies that the overall range of accessibility in the optimization model is
smaller than the 2SFCA methods, so the access appears smoother. The R values that
are small represent dense areas.
2. When the population density is non-homogeneous over the network, we consider
system II. The E2SFCA facility accessibility measures are
S1 =
C









∫ 2R cos θ
0
e−rrdrdθ (A.18)











r1 + r2 ≤ R (A.22)
r1, r2 ≤ R, (A.23)
which implies that
2e−R ≤ e−r1 + e−r2 ≤ 2e−R/2. (A.24)
















For a patient inside the catchment of facility 1 and 2 only: FP1 = F1 and FP2 = F2.
For a patient inside the overlapping area: F1 ≤ FPo ≤ F2. For this system, again we








At the patient level, it is obvious that the following conditions hold:
SrP1 < FP1 and S
r
P2
< FP2 . (A.28)
If R < ln (2/3+(2M+ ε)/V ), then the access under Shortest Distance has a smaller











A.5 Incidence matrix for race/ethnicity






A.6 Additional Figures for Case Study
Figure A.3 shows the simulated CF population and the CF centers in the continental United
States. Figure A.4 shows the histograms of optimization model results.
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Figure A.3: Distribution of simulated population of CF patients in US where uncolored
counties have no patients (A); and locations of CF centers (B).
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Figure A.4: Histograms of optimization model results. (A) Congestion, (B) distance, and
(C) coverage.
A.7 Model specifics: Cystic Fibrosis Implementation
Figure A.5 displays the percentage visits to Cystic Fibrosis care centers from 1997 to 2013
of different distances along with the visits quantified by an exponential decay function with
parameter = 0.02.
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Figure A.5: Actual CF visits compared to visits from optimization
We estimate the number of visits for each patient-CF center pair i,j based on an ex-
ponentially decaying function vij = 10e−0.02dij , dij ≤ 150 miles, and vij = 0, dij > 150
miles. For all patients with family income below two times the Federal Poverty Line (FPL),
vij = 0 for all centers located in other states. All parameters are summarized in Table A.2.
For the 2SFCA methods, the three catchment zones are defined by 0-50, 50-100, and
100-150 miles. We set vi = 10, cj = 1, 500 for j ∈ [m], and we quantify wi on zone








Table A.2: Cystic Fibrosis implementation parameters.
2SFCA Methods Optimization Model
Zone 1 w1 = 0.607 d
adj
ij = dije
0.02dij ,∀dij ≤ 150 miles
Zone 2 w2 = 0.223 and
Zone 3 w3 = 0.082 d
adj
ij = 9, 999,∀dij > 150 miles
Number of counties 2,568





B.1 Illustration of disease modeling
Figure B.1: Example of a contact network.
pA = 0.4 for adults (19-64) and 0.25 for others [95, 96, 97, 98];
Figure B.2: Natural history of the disease.
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pH = 0.18 for children ≤ 5 years; 0.12 for elderly (65+) and 0.06 for others [97, 98];
pD = 0.344 for elderly and children ≤ 5 years and 0.172 for others [98, 99];
pv = 0.75 for individuals who have been vaccinated two weeks ago, 0 for others [38];
Duration of E + IP ∼ Weibull(1.48, 0.47), including an offset of 0.5 days [98, 100];
Duration of IP = 0.5 days [98, 100];
Duration of IS ∼ Exponential(2.73) [98];
Duration of IA ∼ Exponential(1.64) [98];
Duration of IH ∼ Exponential(14) [98, 100];
B.2 Detailed description of allocation policies
We assume that the vaccine supply is available at the beginning of a given week w and
the total amount of vaccine available is Tw. For each census tract i in week w, we have
the population pi, vaccine inventory level vwi (v i
1 = 0,∀i) and the total amount of vaccine
shipped prior to week twi . We calculate the size of potential susceptible population for each




i . Let r
w
i denote the vaccine requirement in census tract i
in week w. Under the PB strategy rwi = pi, for each census tract i and each week w.Under





0, vwi > 0
. Note
that the requirement under PIB is in line with the demand, i.e., the number of people who
are willing to receive the vaccine, who have not been vaccinated, and who have not been





· Tw, Swi amount of vaccine
to each census tract i. In both strategies, fractional levels of vaccine are rounded down to
the nearest integer and if there is any vaccine left, they are distributed proportionally to
census tracts that still demand vaccine.
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B.3 Parameters of the simulation model
During the 2009-2010 influenza vaccine campaign, the vaccine supply (about 120 million
doses) was sufficient to cover about 40% of the US population (about 300 million). Vaccine
was delivered starting around week 40 of 2009 [101]. For the seasonal influenza vaccine,
the uptake rate during the 2009-2010 season was 40.4% for adults, and 43.4% for children
[102]. The solid line in Figure B.3 shows the percentage of total hospital visits that are due
Table B.1: Parameters for vaccination.
Start week 4 and 7
Total supply 20%, 40%, 60%, and 80% of total population
Uptake rate 1) half 25% half 75%; 2) half 0% half 100%; 3) Uniform(0%, 100%)
Distribution horizon 4, 8, and 12 weeks
Effectiveness 75%
R0 1.5, 1.8, and 2.0
to influenza like illnesses (ILI) during the 2009-2010 influenza pandemic and the two dou-
ble lines indicate the time periods for vaccination in our simulation when the vaccination
start week is four or seven and vaccines are distributed for eight weeks. As a comparison,
the dashed straight line is the national baseline for the percentage of hospital visits that are
due to ILI during the regular influenza season. Week one in Figure B.3 corresponds to the
35th week of 2009.
B.4 Analysis on number of iterations
In this study, the number of iterations for each parameter setting is N = 50. Although
the same ten uptake rate instances are used for all the five networks, the 50 IARs pass
all normality test and there are no correlations between networks with the same uptake
rate instance. The maximum sampled standard deviation for all scenarios is σ = 0.015.
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Figure B.3: Percentage of visits for influenza like illness 2009 to 2010 season [103].
On a confidence interval of 95%, which corresponds to a z-value of 1.96, the width is
z · σ√
N
= 0.004 or 0.4% of total population.
B.5 Detailed comparison between strategies under multiple scenarios
For each combination of vaccine supply duration in weeks, vaccination start week and total
vaccine supply, we measure the IAR, the amount of vaccine inventory at the end of the
epidemic and the amount of vaccine administrated for PB and PIB in Table B.2 to B.10.
All p-values and the corresponding confidence intervals are under two-sample t-test with
confidence level 0.95.
B.6 No vaccination vs. vaccination (vaccine supply is 40% population)
B.6.1 IAR when no vaccine is available
Figure B.4 shows that without vaccine, influenza virus spreads to every county of Georgia.
Counties closer to the City of Atlanta tend to have a higher IAR.
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Figure B.4: Total attack rate of each census tract of state of Georgia under no vaccination.
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B.6.2 Peak prevalence and IAR
Prior studies suggest that the overall impact of vaccination can be sensitive to the start time
of vaccination and the amount of vaccine available [104].
Figure B.5 shows the prevalence (percentage of population infected) under no vacci-
nation and vaccination following the PB strategy when the total vaccine supply is equal to
40% of the total population.
Figure B.5: Disease prevalence in Georgia under (i) no vaccination and (ii) PB strategy
when the vaccination start week is week four or seven, and the vaccine distribution horizon
is four weeks or eight weeks.
B.6.3 IAR Comparison
Figure B.6 compares the IAR under the PB strategy for different vaccine supply levels.
Figure B.6A shows the comparison of IAR when the vaccination start week is four or
seven, and the vaccine allocation horizon is four weeks; Figure B.6B is similar but the
vaccine delivery horizon is eight weeks. The IAR is lower for each scenario in Figure
B.6A compared to B.6B. Starting vaccination in week four instead of week seven reduces
the IAR from 37.1% to 23.4% under PB when the vaccine supply is sufficient to cover 40%
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of population and the vaccine distribution horizon is eight weeks.
The importance of the vaccination start week can even outweigh the importance of the
total vaccine supply. For example, consider the two scenarios where (i) vaccine supply
is equivalent to 20% of the population, vaccine distribution horizon is four weeks, and
vaccine start week is week four (IAR = 27.8% for PB), and (ii) vaccine supply is 80% of
the population, vaccine distribution horizon is eight weeks, and vaccine start week is week
seven (IAR = 30.8% for PB). Even though the vaccine inventory is four times higher under
(ii) versus (i), IAR is higher under (ii) because most of the vaccine arrives after the peak.
These observations about the importance of the vaccination start week are consistent with
the previous findings in the literature. [24, 105, 106].
Figure B.6: IAR comparison under different vaccine supply levels when the vaccination
start week is four or seven. B.6A: vaccine is distributed over four weeks. B.6B: vaccine is
distributed over eight weeks.
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B.7 Additional analysis and discussion on PB vs. PIB
B.7.1 Service level
For a given census tract, we defined the service level as the total number of vaccine ad-
ministered divided by the population willing to receive the vaccine. We perform t-tests to
compare the average service levels for PIB and PB. At a 0.05 significance level, for census
tracts with 25% uptake rate, the 95% confidence interval on PIB-PB is 0.0% to 0.1% with
p = 0.0058; for census tracts with 75% uptake rate, the 95% confidence interval on PIB-PB
is 17.7% to 17.8% with p < 0.0001.
B.7.2 Network effect
Figure B.7 shows the network effects when the uptake rate is correlated with education
level (census tracts with 82.4% population (age ≥ 18) with high school or higher degrees
have uptake 75%, others have 25%). The IAR under PIB is 0.2% (95% CI, 0.1% to 0.3%,
p = 0.0017) less than that under PB on average for census tracts with 25% uptake rate and
0.9% (0.8% to 1.0%, p < 0.0001) for census tracts with 75% uptake rate.
B.7.3 Herd Immunity
Interestingly, when vaccine supply is low (20% of population, distributed in week four at
once in Figure B.6), the reduction in IAR is equivalent to 25% of the population (from 50%
to 25%), which is more than the vaccine supplied. However, when vaccine supply is high
(80% supply but same otherwise), the effectiveness of an individual vaccine is less (IAR
reduces from 50.5% down to 8.0%). This is at least in part because some of the vaccines
are unused since the average uptake rate is 50%.
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Figure B.7: IAR difference between PIB and PB strategies at county level. PIB has higher
IAR in darker counties and lower IAR in lighter counties. Dots are census tracts with 75%
uptake rate.
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Table B.2: Comparison on total attack rate under UTR1.
Duration Start Supply PB PIB Avg PB-PIB 95% CI p-value
4
4
20% 27.8% 27.8% 0.1% -0.2% 0.3% 0.6121
40% 17.0% 15.4% 1.6% 1.3% 1.9% 0.0000
60% 12.1% 11.0% 1.1% 0.8% 1.5% 0.0000
80% 10.3% 10.1% 0.2% -0.1% 0.4% 0.2978
7
20% 37.8% 37.9% -0.1% -0.5% 0.2% 0.4145
40% 31.9% 31.2% 0.7% 0.3% 1.2% 0.0026
60% 28.3% 27.9% 0.4% -0.2% 1.0% 0.1826
80% 26.0% 26.2% -0.2% -0.8% 0.4% 0.5514
8
4
20% 33.5% 33.5% -0.1% -0.4% 0.2% 0.7026
40% 23.4% 22.4% 1.0% 0.6% 1.4% 0.0000
60% 17.7% 16.5% 1.2% 0.8% 1.6% 0.0000
80% 14.5% 13.9% 0.7% 0.2% 1.1% 0.0024
7
20% 42.1% 42.1% -0.1% -0.3% 0.2% 0.6651
40% 37.1% 36.7% 0.3% 0.0% 0.7% 0.0804
60% 33.4% 33.0% 0.4% -0.1% 0.9% 0.1348
80% 30.8% 30.9% -0.1% -0.6% 0.4% 0.6408
12
4
20% 37.8% 37.9% 0.0% -0.2% 0.2% 0.9822
40% 28.8% 28.4% 0.4% 0.0% 0.8% 0.0540
60% 22.5% 22.1% 0.4% 0.0% 0.8% 0.0663
80% 18.7% 18.0% 0.7% 0.2% 1.2% 0.0030
7
20% 44.1% 44.0% 0.1% -0.1% 0.3% 0.3899
40% 39.8% 39.8% 0.0% -0.2% 0.3% 0.7486
60% 37.0% 36.8% 0.1% -0.3% 0.6% 0.4969
80% 34.4% 34.3% 0.1% -0.4% 0.6% 0.6855
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Table B.3: Comparison on total attack rate under UTR2.
Duration Start Supply PB PIB Avg PB-PIB 95% CI p-value
4
4
20% 39.4% 33.4% 6.0% 5.8% 6.2% 0.0000
40% 31.4% 24.7% 6.7% 6.4% 6.9% 0.0000
60% 26.1% 21.4% 4.7% 4.4% 5.0% 0.0000
80% 22.8% 20.5% 2.2% 1.9% 2.6% 0.0000
7
20% 43.8% 40.9% 2.9% 2.7% 3.2% 0.0000
40% 39.5% 36.3% 3.1% 2.7% 3.6% 0.0000
60% 36.4% 33.6% 2.7% 2.2% 3.2% 0.0000
80% 34.2% 32.6% 1.6% 1.1% 2.0% 0.0000
8
4
20% 41.9% 36.8% 5.1% 4.9% 5.3% 0.0000
40% 35.6% 29.2% 6.4% 6.0% 6.7% 0.0000
60% 30.9% 24.9% 5.9% 5.5% 6.3% 0.0000
80% 27.2% 23.1% 4.0% 3.7% 4.4% 0.0000
7
20% 45.9% 43.9% 2.1% 1.9% 2.3% 0.0000
40% 43.0% 40.0% 3.0% 2.7% 3.2% 0.0000
60% 40.4% 37.7% 2.7% 2.4% 3.0% 0.0000
80% 38.5% 35.8% 2.8% 2.3% 3.2% 0.0000
12
4
20% 44.0% 39.9% 4.1% 3.9% 4.3% 0.0000
40% 39.2% 33.3% 5.8% 5.6% 6.1% 0.0000
60% 34.9% 28.8% 6.0% 5.7% 6.4% 0.0000
80% 31.6% 26.1% 5.6% 5.2% 5.9% 0.0000
7
20% 47.0% 45.3% 1.7% 1.6% 1.9% 0.0000
40% 44.7% 42.1% 2.6% 2.4% 2.8% 0.0000
60% 42.6% 40.1% 2.5% 2.2% 2.8% 0.0000
80% 40.8% 38.1% 2.7% 2.4% 3.0% 0.0000
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Table B.4: Comparison on total attack rate under UTR3.
Duration Start Supply PB PIB Avg PB-PIB 95% CI p-value
4
4
20% 29.9% 28.7% 1.2% 1.0% 1.4% 0.0000
40% 18.5% 16.5% 2.0% 1.6% 2.3% 0.0000
60% 13.8% 12.7% 1.1% 0.8% 1.4% 0.0000
80% 11.9% 11.5% 0.4% 0.1% 0.8% 0.0230
7
20% 38.8% 38.3% 0.4% 0.1% 0.8% 0.0223
40% 32.5% 31.7% 0.8% 0.2% 1.3% 0.0054
60% 29.5% 28.4% 1.1% 0.6% 1.6% 0.0001
80% 27.5% 26.7% 0.7% 0.2% 1.3% 0.0098
8
4
20% 34.8% 33.9% 0.9% 0.6% 1.2% 0.0000
40% 25.0% 23.4% 1.6% 1.2% 2.0% 0.0000
60% 19.2% 17.5% 1.6% 1.2% 2.0% 0.0000
80% 16.2% 15.1% 1.1% 0.7% 1.4% 0.0000
7
20% 42.5% 42.3% 0.2% -0.1% 0.4% 0.1828
40% 37.9% 37.1% 0.8% 0.5% 1.2% 0.0000
60% 34.6% 33.6% 1.0% 0.6% 1.5% 0.0000
80% 32.0% 31.7% 0.3% -0.2% 0.8% 0.2278
12
4
20% 38.7% 38.1% 0.6% 0.4% 0.8% 0.0000
40% 30.4% 29.0% 1.4% 1.0% 1.8% 0.0000
60% 24.7% 22.8% 1.9% 1.4% 2.3% 0.0000
80% 20.5% 18.8% 1.7% 1.2% 2.3% 0.0000
7
20% 44.4% 44.4% 0.1% -0.1% 0.3% 0.5262
40% 40.4% 40.0% 0.4% 0.1% 0.6% 0.0171
60% 37.8% 37.0% 0.8% 0.4% 1.2% 0.0001
80% 35.0% 34.4% 0.6% 0.1% 1.0% 0.0126
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Table B.5: Comparison on leftover inventory under UTR1.
Duration Start Supply PB PIB Avg PB-PIB 95% CI p-value
4
4
20% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0006
40% 7.9% 2.9% 5.0% 4.9% 5.0% 0.0000
60% 17.7% 11.5% 6.3% 6.1% 6.4% 0.0000
80% 31.5% 11.3% 20.2% 20.1% 20.4% 0.0000
7
20% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.9814
40% 8.5% 3.4% 5.1% 5.0% 5.2% 0.0000
60% 18.5% 15.1% 3.4% 3.2% 3.6% 0.0000
80% 34.6% 14.3% 20.3% 20.1% 20.5% 0.0000
8
4
20% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0000
40% 8.3% 1.5% 6.7% 6.7% 6.8% 0.0000
60% 18.0% 6.0% 12.1% 11.9% 12.2% 0.0000
80% 33.1% 11.8% 21.3% 21.1% 21.6% 0.0000
7
20% 1.0% 0.7% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.0000
40% 9.4% 3.3% 6.1% 6.0% 6.3% 0.0000
60% 20.8% 8.9% 11.9% 11.7% 12.2% 0.0000
80% 38.4% 8.3% 30.0% 29.8% 30.2% 0.0000
12
4
20% 0.7% 0.4% 0.3% 0.2% 0.3% 0.0000
40% 8.8% 1.5% 7.3% 7.2% 7.4% 0.0000
60% 18.7% 5.9% 12.8% 12.6% 13.0% 0.0000
80% 35.2% 7.3% 27.9% 27.7% 28.1% 0.0000
7
20% 1.9% 0.6% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 0.0000
40% 10.4% 5.4% 4.9% 4.8% 5.1% 0.0000
60% 23.8% 7.4% 16.4% 16.2% 16.6% 0.0000
80% 41.5% 7.3% 34.2% 34.0% 34.4% 0.0000
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Table B.6: Comparison on leftover inventory under UTR2.
Duration Start Supply PB PIB Avg PB-PIB 95% CI p-value
4
4
20% 10.2% 2.5% 7.6% 7.5% 7.7% 0.0000
40% 20.1% 5.0% 15.1% 14.9% 15.3% 0.0000
60% 30.1% 8.3% 21.8% 21.6% 22.1% 0.0000
80% 40.1% 10.5% 29.6% 29.3% 30.0% 0.0000
7
20% 10.2% 2.5% 7.6% 7.5% 7.7% 0.0000
40% 20.1% 5.1% 15.0% 14.9% 15.2% 0.0000
60% 30.1% 12.2% 18.0% 17.7% 18.2% 0.0000
80% 40.4% 13.9% 26.5% 26.1% 26.8% 0.0000
8
4
20% 10.3% 1.3% 9.0% 9.0% 9.1% 0.0000
40% 20.3% 2.6% 17.7% 17.6% 17.9% 0.0000
60% 30.3% 5.7% 24.6% 24.3% 24.9% 0.0000
80% 40.3% 6.3% 34.0% 33.7% 34.3% 0.0000
7
20% 10.3% 1.3% 9.0% 9.0% 9.1% 0.0000
40% 20.3% 4.2% 16.1% 15.9% 16.3% 0.0000
60% 30.3% 7.6% 22.7% 22.5% 23.0% 0.0000
80% 43.0% 8.8% 34.2% 33.8% 34.6% 0.0000
12
4
20% 10.5% 0.9% 9.6% 9.5% 9.7% 0.0000
40% 20.5% 2.1% 18.4% 18.3% 18.6% 0.0000
60% 30.5% 5.2% 25.2% 25.0% 25.5% 0.0000
80% 41.0% 5.7% 35.3% 34.9% 35.6% 0.0000
7
20% 10.5% 0.9% 9.6% 9.5% 9.7% 0.0000
40% 20.5% 5.2% 15.3% 15.1% 15.4% 0.0000
60% 30.8% 6.7% 24.1% 23.9% 24.4% 0.0000
80% 45.8% 7.9% 37.9% 37.6% 38.3% 0.0000
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Table B.7: Comparison on leftover inventory under UTR3.
Duration Start Supply PB PIB Avg PB-PIB 95% CI p-value
4
4
20% 2.2% 0.7% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 0.0000
40% 8.4% 3.4% 5.0% 4.9% 5.1% 0.0000
60% 18.7% 12.0% 6.7% 6.5% 6.9% 0.0000
80% 33.2% 13.8% 19.4% 19.2% 19.6% 0.0000
7
20% 2.3% 0.8% 1.6% 1.5% 1.6% 0.0000
40% 9.0% 4.0% 5.0% 4.9% 5.1% 0.0000
60% 20.1% 15.3% 4.9% 4.7% 5.1% 0.0000
80% 35.6% 15.2% 20.4% 20.2% 20.6% 0.0000
8
4
20% 2.3% 0.4% 1.9% 1.9% 1.9% 0.0000
40% 8.8% 2.2% 6.5% 6.4% 6.6% 0.0000
60% 19.5% 7.4% 12.0% 11.9% 12.2% 0.0000
80% 34.3% 9.9% 24.4% 24.2% 24.6% 0.0000
7
20% 2.7% 0.5% 2.1% 2.1% 2.2% 0.0000
40% 10.2% 3.9% 6.3% 6.2% 6.5% 0.0000
60% 22.6% 9.1% 13.5% 13.3% 13.7% 0.0000
80% 39.1% 9.6% 29.4% 29.2% 29.7% 0.0000
12
4
20% 2.6% 0.3% 2.2% 2.2% 2.3% 0.0000
40% 9.5% 2.2% 7.3% 7.2% 7.4% 0.0000
60% 20.8% 6.3% 14.5% 14.3% 14.7% 0.0000
80% 36.1% 7.6% 28.5% 28.2% 28.7% 0.0000
7
20% 3.1% 0.5% 2.6% 2.6% 2.6% 0.0000
40% 11.4% 5.5% 5.9% 5.7% 6.0% 0.0000
60% 25.0% 7.5% 17.5% 17.3% 17.7% 0.0000
80% 42.0% 7.8% 34.3% 34.0% 34.5% 0.0000
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Table B.8: Comparison on amount of vaccine administered under UTR1.
Duration Start Supply PB PIB Avg PB-PIB 95% CI p-value
4
4
20% 20.0% 20.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0006
40% 32.1% 37.1% 5.0% 4.9% 5.0% 0.0000
60% 42.3% 48.5% 6.3% 6.1% 6.4% 0.0000
80% 48.5% 48.7% 0.2% 0.1% 0.4% 0.0117
7
20% 19.9% 19.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.9814
40% 31.5% 36.6% 5.1% 5.0% 5.2% 0.0000
60% 41.5% 44.9% 3.4% 3.2% 3.6% 0.0000
80% 45.4% 45.7% 0.3% 0.1% 0.5% 0.0164
8
4
20% 19.9% 19.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0000
40% 31.7% 38.5% 6.7% 6.7% 6.8% 0.0000
60% 42.0% 46.7% 4.8% 4.6% 4.9% 0.0000
80% 46.9% 47.7% 0.9% 0.7% 1.0% 0.0000
7
20% 19.0% 19.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.0000
40% 30.6% 36.7% 6.1% 6.0% 6.3% 0.0000
60% 39.2% 40.8% 1.6% 1.4% 1.8% 0.0000
80% 41.6% 42.7% 1.0% 0.8% 1.3% 0.0000
12
4
20% 19.3% 19.6% 0.3% 0.2% 0.3% 0.0000
40% 31.2% 38.5% 7.3% 7.2% 7.4% 0.0000
60% 41.3% 44.1% 2.8% 2.6% 3.0% 0.0000
80% 44.8% 46.2% 1.4% 1.2% 1.5% 0.0000
7
20% 18.1% 19.4% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 0.0000
40% 29.6% 34.2% 4.5% 4.4% 4.7% 0.0000
60% 36.2% 37.3% 1.1% 0.8% 1.3% 0.0000
80% 38.5% 39.7% 1.3% 1.0% 1.5% 0.0000
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Table B.9: Comparison on amount of vaccine administered under UTR2.
Duration Start Supply PB PIB Avg PB-PIB 95% CI p-value
4
4
20% 9.8% 17.5% 7.6% 7.5% 7.7% 0.0000
40% 19.9% 35.0% 15.1% 14.9% 15.3% 0.0000
60% 29.9% 48.2% 18.4% 17.9% 18.8% 0.0000
80% 39.9% 48.6% 8.7% 8.2% 9.2% 0.0000
7
20% 9.8% 17.5% 7.6% 7.5% 7.7% 0.0000
40% 19.9% 34.9% 15.0% 14.9% 15.2% 0.0000
60% 29.9% 44.1% 14.2% 13.7% 14.7% 0.0000
80% 39.6% 45.0% 5.4% 4.9% 5.9% 0.0000
8
4
20% 9.7% 18.7% 9.0% 9.0% 9.1% 0.0000
40% 19.7% 37.4% 17.7% 17.6% 17.9% 0.0000
60% 29.7% 46.5% 16.8% 16.4% 17.2% 0.0000
80% 39.7% 47.4% 7.8% 7.3% 8.2% 0.0000
7
20% 9.7% 18.7% 9.0% 9.0% 9.1% 0.0000
40% 19.7% 35.8% 16.1% 15.9% 16.3% 0.0000
60% 29.7% 39.8% 10.2% 9.8% 10.6% 0.0000
80% 37.0% 42.0% 5.0% 4.5% 5.5% 0.0000
12
4
20% 9.5% 19.1% 9.6% 9.5% 9.7% 0.0000
40% 19.5% 37.9% 18.4% 18.3% 18.6% 0.0000
60% 29.5% 43.9% 14.4% 14.0% 14.8% 0.0000
80% 39.0% 45.8% 6.8% 6.4% 7.3% 0.0000
7
20% 9.5% 19.1% 9.6% 9.5% 9.7% 0.0000
40% 19.5% 33.8% 14.3% 14.0% 14.6% 0.0000
60% 29.2% 36.6% 7.4% 7.1% 7.8% 0.0000
80% 34.2% 39.1% 5.0% 4.5% 5.4% 0.0000
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Table B.10: Comparison on amount of vaccine administered under UTR3.
Duration Start Supply PB PIB Avg PB-PIB 95% CI p-value
4
4
20% 17.8% 19.3% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 0.0000
40% 31.6% 36.6% 5.0% 4.9% 5.1% 0.0000
60% 41.3% 48.0% 6.7% 6.5% 6.9% 0.0000
80% 46.8% 48.5% 1.6% 1.4% 1.9% 0.0000
7
20% 17.7% 19.2% 1.6% 1.5% 1.6% 0.0000
40% 31.0% 36.0% 5.0% 4.9% 5.1% 0.0000
60% 39.9% 44.6% 4.7% 4.5% 5.0% 0.0000
80% 44.4% 45.6% 1.2% 0.9% 1.5% 0.0000
8
4
20% 17.7% 19.6% 1.9% 1.9% 1.9% 0.0000
40% 31.2% 37.8% 6.5% 6.4% 6.6% 0.0000
60% 40.5% 46.5% 5.9% 5.7% 6.2% 0.0000
80% 45.7% 47.4% 1.7% 1.5% 2.0% 0.0000
7
20% 17.3% 19.5% 2.1% 2.1% 2.2% 0.0000
40% 29.8% 36.1% 6.3% 6.2% 6.5% 0.0000
60% 37.4% 40.5% 3.1% 2.8% 3.3% 0.0000
80% 40.9% 42.3% 1.4% 1.1% 1.7% 0.0000
12
4
20% 17.4% 19.7% 2.2% 2.2% 2.3% 0.0000
40% 30.5% 37.8% 7.3% 7.2% 7.4% 0.0000
60% 39.2% 43.9% 4.7% 4.4% 5.0% 0.0000
80% 43.9% 45.9% 2.0% 1.7% 2.3% 0.0000
7
20% 16.9% 19.5% 2.6% 2.6% 2.6% 0.0000
40% 28.6% 34.0% 5.3% 5.2% 5.5% 0.0000
60% 35.0% 37.2% 2.2% 2.0% 2.5% 0.0000





C.1.1 Algorithm 1: upper bound
1. Calculate the total utility TU = p
∑n
j=1 uj , the average remaining utility for unas-
signed workers AR = TU
n
, and set the initialize current utility CU = pn. Initialize
k = 1.
2. Assign αp times job k to worker k, and assign the remaining (1 − α)p unassigned
jobs with the least utilities to worker k. Update the following quantity:




k ← k + 1.
Repeat step 2 until CU < AR or k = n.
3. If k = n then let k∗ = n and ub = AR. If CU < AR then output the number of
workers assigned as k∗ = k − 1 and the upper bound as:
ub = b(TU + CU)/(n− k∗)c.
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C.1.2 Algorithm 2: transform optimal solutions such that the first k∗ workers are assigned
the same jobs as in Algorithm 1
1. If worker k is assigned less than or equal to i = αp times to jobs with utility ≥ uk,
i.e.,
∑k
s=1M(s, k) ≤ i, go to 2. Otherwise, switch higher utility jobs assigned to
worker k with lower utility jobs until k is only assigned i times to jobs with utility
greater or equal to uk.
(a) among jobs assigned to k in M differently from Algorithm 1, identify the jobs
with the smallest (a) and largest (b) index;
(b) let w∗ denote the worker with the largest index assigned to job b in M , differ-
ently from Algorithm 1;
(c) switch job b from worker w∗ to k and job a from worker k to w∗;
(d) repeat until
∑k
s=1M(s, k) ≤ i.
2. Now the number of times worker k is assigned to a job with utility greater or equal
to uk is i. If worker k is assigned to job k exactly i times, go to 3. Otherwise,
M(k, k) < i ∧
∑k
s=1M(ws, k) = i. We switch out jobs with utility higher than uk
from worker k and switch in job k to worker k.
(a) among jobs assigned to worker k in M differently from Algorithm 1, identify
the jobs with the smallest (a) index;
(b) let w∗ denote the worker with the smallest index assigned with job k in M ,
differently from Algorithm 1;
(c) switch job a from worker k to w∗ and job k from worker w∗ to worker k;
(d) repeat until worker k is assigned to job k exactly i times.
3. Now all other jobs assigned to worker k have utility less than uk. If the assignments
are the same as in Algorithm 1, go to 4. Otherwise,
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(a) identify the set of jobs Jk, to which worker k is assigned differently from Algo-
rithm 1; identify the jobs in Jk with the smallest (j∗) and largest (j′) index;
(b) identify w∗, the worker with the largest index and is assigned more periods to
job j′ in M than in Algorithm 1;
(c) switch job j∗ out from worker k and identify the set of workers (Wk) who are
involved in the pairs with stability less than α;
(d) if Wk is empty, switch job j∗ to worker w∗ and switch job j′ from worker w∗ to
worker k; otherwise:
i. switch job j∗ to worker w∗, the most preferred worker by job j∗ in Wk;
ii. identify j′′, the job with the least utility worker w∗ is assigned to (j′′ > j′
since otherwise w∗ is only assigned with jobs no worse than j′ and (w∗, j′)
would be α-stable, contradicting to w∗ ∈ Wk);
iii. switch out job j′′ from worker w∗, set j′ = j′′ and update Wk. Repeat (d)
until Wk is empty.
(e) repeat step 3 until all assignments of k are the same as in Algorithm 1.
4. Let k ← k + 1 and repeat 1 to 3 until k = k∗ + 1.
C.1.3 Algorithm 3: algorithm for α ≤ 1
2
(static, vertical heterogeneity)
When the number of periods p is even, the assignment is easy: for each k ∈ [n], assign
worker k to job k in half of the periods and to job n − k + 1 in the other half. When the
number of periods p is odd, the quantity p(n+1)
2
can be fractional and needed to be rounded
down. We solve for when p = 3 and α ≤ p−1
2p









+ 1. In the proof of Theorem 3 we show that this solution achieves





. If p > 3, we can divide the problem into two
problems (problem 1 and problem 2) with the same number of workers and jobs (n), but
with the number of periods p1 = 3 and p2 = p − 3 (even), and combine the assignments
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from the subproblems. This solution provides one period of stable assignment in problem
1 and p−3
2







proof verifies that the optimal value is achieved for both odd and even combinations of the
number of agents (n) and the number of periods p.










. Let p = p− 3.
2. In the remaining periods (which is even), for each worker k ∈ [n], assign worker k
to job k and job n− k + 1 exactly p
2
times .
C.1.4 Algorithm 3: algorithm for α ≤ 1
2
(static, more general preference lists)
For i ∈ [n], obtain the utility uii of the worker-job pair (i, i) and rank workers in descending
order of uii, denoted as ”utility ranking” w1 through wn. Let j1 be worker wn’s favorite job
and for all 2 ≤ k ≤ n, subsequently define jk the favorite job of worker wn−k+1 excluding
jobs j1 through jk−1.
Similarly we obtain two copies of job 1 through job n. Let jh1 be worker wn’s favorite
job and subsequently define jhk the favorite job of worker wn−k+1 excluding jobs j
h
1 through




2 . Now there are n
jobs left. For the remaining jobs, we let jl1 be worker wn’s favorite job and j
l
k be the job
worker wn−k+1 prefers the most excluding all jobs jhk , k ∈ n and jobs jl1 through jlk−1.
1. For each worker i ∈ [n], obtain the index k such that i = wk, k ∈ [n] (if workers
have identical preference lists, i = k), and
2. if p is odd, assign job i, jhn−k+1, and j
l
n−k+1 exactly once to worker k and let p← p−3
and go to step 3.
3. Otherwise, assign job i and job jn−k+1 each p2 times.
108
C.1.5 Heuristic 1: heuristic for 1
2
< α ≤ 3
4
(static, vertical heterogeneity)





, assign worker i exactly αp times to job i and (1−α)p times to
job n− i+ 1.
2. If α = p+1
2p





+ 1 to n, then





+ 1 exactly (1− α)p− 1
times.
(b) There are p− 2 · ((1−α)p− 1) = (2α− 1)p+2 = 3 periods left to assign. If i
































(c) If α > p+1
2p
, assign worker i exactly (1− α)p times to job i and n− i+ 1. Now






















from the index of every worker and job. Assign the new problem
with n′, p′, α ≤ 1
2
and with the same preference lists using Algorithm 3. After





to the index of every worker and job and
combine with the other assignments in the first 2(1− α)p periods.
C.1.6 Heuristic 1: heuristic for 1
2
< α ≤ 3
4
(static, more general preference lists)









similarly to that in section C.1.4 and let wk be the corresponding utility ranking of





+ 1 through n and
subsequently define jlk the favorite job of worker wn−k+1 excluding jobs w1 through wk−1.





, obtain the utility ranking wdn2 e+1 through wn. If n is odd (even),

























k similarly for worker wn−k+1 with





+ 1 through n.






, assign worker i exactly αp times to job i and (1−α)p times to job
jln−k+1.
2. If α = p+1
2p





+ 1 to n, then
(a) If p > 3, assign worker i to job i and job jhn−k+1 exactly (1− α)p− 1 times.
(b) There are p − 2 · ((1 − α)p − 1) = (2α − 1)p + 2 = 3 periods left to assign.
Assign worker i to job i, jhn−k+1 and j
l
n−k+1 once.
3. If α > p+1
2p
, assign worker i exactly (1 − α)p times to job i and jhn−k+1. Now there






















index of every worker and job. Assign the new problem with n′, p′, α ≤ 1
2
and with





to the index of every worker and job and combine with the other assignments in the
first 2(1− α)p periods.
C.1.7 Heuristic 2: heuristic for α > 3
4
(static, vertical heterogeneity)






) assigned similarly in Heuristic 1. This quantity is determined by α and another
quantity t, where t is obtained by calculating how many “good” jobs is needed to bring the
utility of worker n close to the upper bound. We refer workers 1 through n− x “the higher
ranking workers” and refer workers n− x+ 1 through n ”the lower ranking workers”. We
simultaneously assign t best jobs and p− t worst jobs starting from worker n. The quantity
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x is obtained by calculating where the best jobs meet the worst jobs: tx







1. Obtain an upper bound ub from Algorithm 1. Let M be an n× n assignment matrix.
Temporarily assign worker n exactly p times to job n. We switch the best jobs to
worker n one by one to improve the utility.
2. Let CU be the utility of worker n in the current iteration, and NU be the utility of
worker n in the next iteration. Initialize CU = p,NU = p + n, and t = 0. Perform






3. For i ≤ n − x, assign worker i to job i exactly αp times. For i ≥ n − x + 1,
assign worker i to job i exactly p− t times. Starting from worker n, assign the best t
available jobs to the current worker, until all workers i > n− x have been assigned.
Finally for workers 1 through n − x, starting with worker n − x, assign the best
available jobs one by one to the current worker, until all workers i ≤ n−x have been
assigned.
C.1.8 Heuristic 2: heuristic for α > 3
4
(static, more general preference lists)
1. Obtain ub from Algorithm 1. Let M be an n×n assignment matrix. Suppose worker
w is assigned to job j in the in the worker-optimal stable matching and worker w has
the minimum utility. Temporarily assign worker w exactly p times to job j and let
jleast be the least preferred job on worker w’s preference list. Let jmost be the job
with maximum utility among jobs not assigned to worker w. Switch jleast to jmost
one by one to improve the utility of worker w.
2. Let CU be the utility of worker n in the current iteration, and NU be the utility of
worker w in the next iteration. Initialize CU = p,NU = p + n, and t = 0. Perform
step 3, update CU,NU until |NU − ub| > |CU − ub|.
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3. For i ≤ n − x, assign worker i to job i exactly αp times. For i ≥ n − x + 1, assign
worker i to job i exactly p − t times. For workers n − x + 1 to n, obtain wn−x+1 to
wn similar in section C.1.4 with the remaining jobs. Starting from worker wn, assign
the best t available jobs to the current worker until all workers i ≤ n − x have been
assigned. Finally for workers 1 through n− x, obtain w1 to wn−x similarly using the
remaining jobs. Starting with worker wn−x, assign the best available jobs one by one
to the current worker wk in descending order of k.
C.1.9 Heuristic 3: heuristic for a > 1
2
(static, vertical heterogeneity)
1. Obtain upper bound ub and assignments of the first k∗ workers from Algorithm 1.
2. For each worker k∗ + 1 ≤ k ≤ n, assign jobs to meet the required stability with
minimum utility and switch lower utility jobs with higher utility jobs one by one to
increase the individual utility of worker k. Without loss of generality, we assume
k∗ ≤ n − 2 (otherwise Algorithm 3 will give full assignment). Let cp = 0 be the
number of periods reserved for maintaining the stable-levels.
(a) Assign i′ = i − cp jobs with the least utility among jobs with utility higher
or equal to k to worker k. Update the available job list and assign the p − i
available jobs with the least utility to worker k.
i. If all the available jobs have utility greater or equal to k, then all pairs
involving workers from k to n are α-stable. We assign jobs in descending
order of utility to workers in ascending order of individual utility one by
one until all workers and jobs are assigned.
ii. Otherwise, we identify which job to switch out from worker k:
A. among all jobs assigned to worker k, choose the one with the least
utility if there is at most one job with utility more than k assigned to
worker k;
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B. otherwise, choose the one with the second least utility.
Obtain the current utility utk of worker k. Let kleast be the job identified
above to switch out, and uwk be the utility of job kleast.
(b) ub−utk is our targeted improvement on worker k’s utility. Among the available
jobs, if the job with the most utility, kmost, has utility ubk and ubk − uwk ≤
ub − utk, switch kleast with kmost for worker k. Update the available job list,
re-identify kmost, kleast and repeat 2.(b) until ubk − uwk > ub− utk. This step
is incorporated in procedure BOOST.








{|(u′j − uwk)− (ub− utk)|}.
If there is a tie, switch to the job with maximum utility.
(d) If k is assigned to job k less than the number of times that worker k − 1 is
assigned to job k − 1, then there is risk that workers k + 1, ..., n will be un-
stable. We design procedure PREVENT to assign worker s, s > k exactly one
best available jobs one by one. If there are not enough jobs better than job k
available, then rollback one iteration of switching on worker k and move to the
next worker. Increment the number of times PREVENT is called cp ← cp + 1,
let k ← k + 1 and repeat Step 2.
C.1.10 Heuristic 4: heuristic side to middle (dynamic p = 3, α ≤ 1
3
)
1. In period one, assign worker i to job i for all i ∈ [n] and update the workers’ prefer-
ence lists.
2. In period two, obtain the worker ranking wk based on individual utility in period one
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for each worker i ∈ [n]. Define jhk and jlk similarly in section C.1.4 for the updated
preference lists. If i is odd, assign worker i to jln−k+1; if i is even, assign worker i to
jhn−k+1. Update workers’ preference lists.
3. In period three, for workers i ∈ [n], update the worker rankings wk based on the
total individual utility in period one and two and the index mapping i = wk. Define
j31 the favorite job of worker wn (with least individual utility in period one and two)
and subsequently define j3k as the favorite remaining job of worker wk excluding j
3
1
through j3k−1. Assign worker i to job j
3
k ,∀i ∈ [n].
C.1.11 Heuristic 5: heuristic side to middle (dynamic p = 3, 1
3
< α ≤ 2
3
)
1. In period one, assign worker i to job i for all i ∈ [n] and update the workers’ prefer-
ence lists.
2. In period two, obtain the utility ranking wk based on individual utility in period one











even, assign worker i to job i − 1. Similar to that in section C.1.4, define jhk and jlk
















, assign worker i to job jln−k+1
and update workers’ preference lists.





, update the worker rankings wk based on the total









, define j3k similarly with
the remaining jobs. Assign worker i ∈ [n] to job j3k .
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C.2 Proof of Theorems and Corollaries
C.2.1 Theorem 1: upper bound
Proof. We prove this theorem by induction. For iteration k = 1, the minimum number
of times job 1 is assigned to worker 1 for worker-job pair (1, 1) to meet the stability re-
quirement is αp. By assumptions on the preference lists, worker-job pair (1, t), t ≥ 1 and
(t, 1), t ≥ 1 have stability α. For k ≥ 2, assume that every worker t < k is assigned to job
t exactly αp times and the job with the least utility is > k. Then there are several ways to
satisfy the stability requirement for pair (k, k):
1. worker k is assigned to job k exactly αp times,
2. worker k is assigned to job 1 through k exactly αp times, and
3. worker k is assigned to job 1 through k exactly nk < αp times, job k prefers some
workers from 1 through k− 1 to worker k and job k is assigned to these jobs exactly
αp− nk times.
Note that Case 2 always assigns more or the same utility to workers from 1 to k compared
to Case 1, so Case 2 is undesirable. In Case 3, we can assume that worker k is assigned to
job k exactly nk times. Worker k is assigned to jobs with the least utility p− nk times and
some workers from 1 through k − 1 that job k prefers than worker k are assigned less than
(1−α)p times to jobs with the least utility. If we calculate the total utility of jobs assigned
to workers from 1 to k, it is the same compared to Case 1, which is what Algorithm 1 does.
Furthermore, for two consecutive workers s and s + 1, the average remaining utility is
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decreasing:
ARs − ARs+1 =











which gives CUs ≥ ARs > ARs+1. In other words, every worker is assigned to utility
greater than the final output ARk∗ . Therefore, Algorithm 1 gives an upper bound on the
objective function value.
C.2.2 Theorem 2: correctness of transform algorithm
Proof. Suppose a given assignment matrix M is optimal and at least one of the first k∗
workers are not assigned the same as in Algorithm 1. For k = 1, the number of jobs
assigned to worker k with utility greater or equal to uk is at least αp since M is α-stable.
We inductively show that in every step of Algorithm 2, the number of switches is finite,
and the resulting new matching is still α-stable. Since at the end of the algorithm, workers
k ≤ k∗ are assigned the same as in Algorithm 1, their individual utilities are greater or
equal to the upper bound. We only need to show that for workers > k∗, the utility is still
greater or equal to the upper bound.
1. For step 1:
• w∗ is assigned with a better job (a over b);
• the stability of all pairs involving job a are met by the inductive hypothesis on
stable assignment: M(s, s) = αp, s < k and
∑k
s=1M(s, k) = αp;
• the stability of all pairs involving job b are met since job b has the least utility
among all jobs assigned to worker k, ..., n.
For each k, there are at most (1− α)p jobs we need to switch in this step.
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2. For step 2:
• w∗ is assigned with better jobs (a over k);
• the stability of all pairs involving job a and k are met since a < k andM(s, s) =
αp, s ∈ [k].
For each k, there are at most αp jobs we need to switch in this step.
3. For step 3:
• in each iteration, w∗ is assigned to a better job;
• in each iteration, assigning j′ to other workers does not affect the stability of
pairs involving job j′ by definition of Wk.
For each k, we can switch at most (1−α)p jobs and each job can be switched at most
n− k∗ times.
The number of switches performed in this algorithm is at most k∗((1 − α)p + αp + (1 −
α)p(n − k∗)) ≤ n(p + pn) = np(n + 1). Therefore the complexity of this algorithm is
O(n2p).
C.2.3 Theorem 11: NP-hardness reduction
Theorem 11. Consider the following decision problem:
When workers have the same preference lists, jobs have arbitrary preference
lists, and the utility of job k, uk ∈ Z+ ∪ {0},∀k ∈ [n] satisfies u1 ≥ · · · ≥
un ≥ 0, is there an α-stable p-period assignment to the multi-period stable
matching problem such that the minimum utility over all workers is greater or
equal to K ∈ Z?
This decision problem is NP-complete.
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The proof uses the fact that when the number of periods p is sufficiently large and
α = p−1
p
, the number of workers assigned by Algorithm 1, k∗, can be exactly n − 2, and
worker k is assigned to job k exactly p − 1 times for k ∈ [n − 2]. The remaining two
workers, n− 1 and n, are left with each of jobs 1 through n - 2 and several jobs n− 1 and
n. If the utilities of jobs n − 1 and n are both 0, this specific problem is equivalent to the
partition problem (with numbers equal to the utilities of job 1 through n− 2).
Proof. We reduce theNP-complete partition problem to the multi-period stable matching
problem with a particular stability requirement:
Given a set of distinct positive integers S = {ai, i ∈ [m]} with descending
order of ak ∈ Z+, ∀k ∈ [m], is there a partition of S such that the sum of the
integers in each subset equal to K?















. Running Algorithm 1 and checking the stopping
condition, we have k∗ = m.
1. If the partition problem has a “yes” answer, let S = S1 ∪ S2 be the solution. For
workers k ∈ [m], assign p − 1 times job k to worker k and job m + 2 to worker k
one time. Assign jobs indicated in S1 and p − s1 times job m + 1 to worker m + 1.
Assign jobs indicated in S2 and the remaining jobs to worker m+ 2. It’s easy to see
that the assignment is p−1
p
-stable, since every worker k is assigned to job k at least
p− 1 times for k ∈ [m], and every job that worker m+ 1 and m+ 2 are assigned to
are no worse than job m + 1 and m + 2, respectively. The utility of worker m + 1
and m+ 2 is K, and the utilities of workers 1 through m are larger than K.
2. If the multi-period stable matching problem has a “yes” answer with an assignment
matrix M , by Theorem 2, M can be transformed into another optimal solution M ′
with the property that M ′(k, k) = p − 1,∀k ∈ [m]. Since the minimum utility over
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all workers is K, the assignments of workers m+1 and m+2, excluding jobs m+1
and m+ 2 form a partition of the multi-set S, with the sum of each subset being K.
Therefore, a partition problem can be reduced to a multi-period stable matching problem.
In the proof, we assumed that the last job is strictly less preferred by all workers com-
pared to other jobs. However since the last two jobs have utility 0, it could be more rea-
sonable to assume that all workers are indifferent between the last two jobs (ties). In weak
stable matchings, a worker-job pair not in matchingM is a blocking pair if each member of
the pair prefers the other to their partner in matchingM . A matching without such blocking
pairs is weakly stable. In several papers, it was shown that a matching M is weakly stable
in a preference list P with ties, if it is stable in at least one instance P ′ of stable matching
which can be derived from P by randomly breaking the ties [107, 108, 109]. We expect
our results to hold under ties if we define α-stable matchings in multiple periods similarly.
C.2.4 Theorem 3: correctness of Algorithm 3 (static, reverse rank utility, α ≤ 1
2
)








which equals to the optimal value since every worker has the same utility. The stability for
each worker-job pair (i, i) is at least p
2
since M(i, i) ≥ p
2
,∀k ∈ [n]. Recall that the utility
ranking of worker i is wk and in the unique stable assignment, worker i is assigned to a job












When p is odd, let us first consider p = 3: the utility received by worker i is at least










(for jln−k+1). The total utility
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(a) k is even, the total utility of worker i is at least









(b) k is odd, then the total utility of worker i is at least

















(a) k is even, the total utility of worker i is at least









(b) k is odd, the total utility of worker i is at least









When workers have identical preference lists, the utility of worker i is greater or equal
to the optimal value in every case. For odd p ≥ 5, Algorithm 3 first gives a three-period
assignment, then adds a p−3 (even) period assignment. Both assignments give equal utility
(maximum difference on utility between any worker is 1) to all workers. For preference
lists satisfying the SPC conditions, each worker i has utility at least the same as that of
worker i when workers have identical preference lists.





also gives an optimal solution by symmetry of the assignments.
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C.2.5 Theorem 4: correctness of Heuristic 1 (static, 1
2
< α ≤ 3
4
) on more general preference
lists





. By condition (4.9) and (4.10), all










have stability α, as workers are assigned to






1. If α = p+1
2p














+1 (since k > n− k+1), and (1−α) times to job
i. The stability for any remaining pair is at least 2(1− α) = p−1
p
≥ α.
2. Otherwise, α > p+1
2p





















times to job i. Therefore, any






























If p is even, then α ≤ 3
4





We know that when p is odd, taking α = 3
4







≤ q + 1
p
(C.4)
=⇒ 4q ≤ 3p ≤ 4q + 4. (C.5)
Since p is odd, the quantity 3p is odd. Also since 4q and 4q + 4 are both even, we
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can further tighten the inequality as














Therefore when p is odd, requiring α ≤ 3
4





C.2.6 Theorem 12: correctness of Heuristic 2 (static, α > 3
4
) on more general preference
lists
Theorem 12 (Correctness of Heuristic 2). For p ≥ 3, Heuristic 2 gives an α-stable assign-
ment for α > 3
4
.
Proof. Heuristic 2 assigns αp times job i to worker i for i ∈ [n − x], so worker-job pairs
(s, q) with s ∈ n − x or q ∈ n − x are α-stable by conditions (4.9) and (4.10). For any
other pair (s, q) with s < q, s > n − x and q > n − x, worker s is either assigned to job
s or a job r ≤ n − x, both better than job q. For any pair (s, q), s > q, s > n − x and
q > n − x, worker s is assigned to job r ≤ n − x (better than job q) t times and job q is
assigned to worker q (better than worker s) p− t times. Therefore, the stability for (s, q) is
1 for s > n− x, q > n− x and all worker-jobs pairs are α-stable.
C.2.7 Theorem 13: correctness of Heuristic 3 on vertical heterogeneity
Theorem 13 (Correctness of Heuristic 2 on vertical heterogeneity). For p ≥ 3, Heuristic 3
gives an α-stable assignment for α > 1
2
.
Proof. For pairs involving workers k ≤ k∗, the stability requirements are satisfied because
worker k is assigned to job k in αp periods. For the rest of pairs involving workers k > k∗,
the stability requirements are satisfied because worker k is assigned to job k in i′ periods,
where i′ = i− cp, and worker k is assigned to jobs better than job k in cp periods.
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C.2.8 Theorem 5: upper bound calculation (static, α > 1
2
) on vertical heterogeneity
Proof. Let q = αp. By construction of Algorithm 1, when the algorithm terminates we
have the following two conditions.
1. The total utility worker k∗ receives over p periods is at least the average remaining
utility at step k∗ (denoted as ub):
(n− k∗)(q(n− k∗ + 1) + dk∗(p− q)/pe(p− q)) ≥
(pn(n+ 1)/2− qk∗(2n− k∗ + 1)/2−
(p− q)(1 + bk∗(p− q)/pc)(bk∗(p− q)/pc/2)−
(dk∗(p− q)/pe)p(k∗(p− q)− bk∗(p− q)/pc)).
(C.8)
2. The total utility worker k∗+1 receives over p periods is at most the average remaining
utility at step k∗ + 1 (if carried out):
(n− (k∗ + 1))(q(n− k∗) + d(k∗ + 1)(p− q)/pe(p− q)) ≤
(pn(n+ 1)/2− q(k∗ + 1)(2n− k∗)/2−
(p− q)(1 + b(k∗ + 1)(p− q)/pc)(b(k∗ + 1)(p− q)/pc/2)−
(d(k∗ + 1)(p− q)/pe)p((k∗ + 1)(p− q)− b(k∗ + 1)(p− q)/pc)).
(C.9)
Let β = limn→∞ k
∗
n
be the percentage of workers assigned in Algorithm 1, then from (C.8)
to (C.9) we have:
n2(1− β)(q(1− β) + β(p− q)2/p) =
pn(n+ 1)/2− n2qβ(2− β)/2− n2β2(p− q)2/2p,
(C.10)
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and β can be obtained by solving the following equation:









3α− α2 − 1
. (C.12)









= (1− α)2 +
√
α(1− α)(3α− α2 − 1). (C.13)
C.2.9 Corollary 6: analytical performance of Heuristic 1 (static, 1
2









, let wk = i be the corresponding utility ranking. The utility of
worker wk is at least:
αp(n− k + 1) + (1− α)pk = p(αn+ α− (2α− 1)k), (C.14)
which is a decreasing function on k since α > 1
2
, and the minimum utility is at least the
utility of worker wdn2 e:
umin1 = p
(






















































































We now compare umin1 and umin2:
umin1 − umin2 = p
(





















































































(n+ 1) > 0 (C.25)
Therefore we have umin2 as the minimum individual utility. For large enough n, the assign-










We then have that the optimality gap between uhe(α) and the normalized (by n, p) optimal

















α(1− α)(3α− α2 − 1)) + (1− α)2
(C.30)
The less than or equal sign follows from:









The maximum of G(α) is achieved at α ≈ 0.74, with a value of 11.07%.
C.2.10 Lemma 1: for proof of Theorem 7
Lemma 1 (Linearity of worker utility). In Heuristic 2, let uwn be the utility obtained
for worker wn, uwx be the utility of worker wn−x, and let uwl be the utility of worker






















Proof. By construction of Heuristic 2 and the property of floor and ceiling functions, we
have
(n− p)t+ p− t ≤ uwn ≤ nt+ p− t (C.33)
tx+ (p− t)(x− 1) ≤ uwx ≤ px (C.34)
(C.35)
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Therefore inequality (C.32) holds, which means the minimum utility is attained either by
worker n − x or worker n and every worker has a higher utility when preference lists are
SPC.
C.2.11 Theorem 7: performance of Heuristic 2 (static, α > 3
4
) on vertical heterogeneity
Proof. By Lemma 1, either worker n or worker n − x attains the minimum utility when
workers have identical preference lists. This is also the minimum utility of workers when
the preference lists satisfy SPC. In Heuristic 2, the total utility of worker n is within n
2
of
the upper bound by definition of t:
ub− n
2











≤ UB(α) + 1
2p
(C.39)
Also by definition of t,
ub− n
2










≤ UB(α) + 1
2p
(C.41)
























C.2.12 Lemma 2: dynamic problem is polynomially solvable for p ≤ 2
Lemma 2. The dynamic problem can be solved efficiently when p ≤ 2.
Proof. We define job j21 as the favorite job of worker n and subsequently j
2
k as worker
n − k + 1’s favorite job, excluding jobs j21 through j2k−1. In period two we assign job j2k
to worker k for all k ∈ [n]. It is easy to see that job j2k provides at least n − k + 1 utility
to worker k, and the objective value for this assignment is n − k + 1 + k = n + 1 and
optimal.
C.2.13 Lemma 3: correctness of Heuristic 4 (dynamic, p = 3, α ≤ 1
3
)
Lemma 3. For p = 3 and α ≤ 1
3
Heuristic 4 returns an α-stable solution.
Proof. When α ≤ 1
3





, so every worker-job
pair in period one is 1
3




C.2.14 Theorem 14: correctness of Heuristic 5 (dynamic, p = 3, 1
3
< α ≤ 2
3
)
Theorem 14. For p = 3 and α ≥ 1
3
Heuristic 5 returns an α-stable solution.
Proof. When 1
3
< α ≤ 2
3
and n is even (odd).
1. In period one, worker i is assigned to job i, ∀i ∈ [n], which is the unique stable
assignment.





is assigned to the favorite job excluding all jobs
assigned to workers k < i. At the same time, these jobs are assigned to their favorite
workers excluding all workers assigned to jobs with lower indexes and the worker















































to n in workers’ preference






































































period two by construction of the heuristic. In period one, no pair is a blocking pair.













































period one, which is the least favorite job in period two.
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C.2.15 Theorem 8: upper bound for the dynamic problem
Proof. In period one, job j provides a utility of n− j + 1 to any worker. In period two, if
job j is assigned to worker i and worker i was assigned to job q < j in period one, then job
j provides utility min{n− j + 2, n}; if worker i was assigned to job j, then job j provides
utility 1; if worker iwas assigned to job q > j, then job j provides the same utility n−j+1
as in period one. It is easy to see that the maximum utility job j provides in period two is
min{n − j + 2, n}, which is at most 1 more than what job j could provide in period one.
Making the same argument inductively on the number of periods p, we have the maximum
potential utility Umax of job j can provide to any worker in period t is
Umax(j, t) = min{n, n− j + t}. (C.44)
We then calculate an upper bound UBdy for the dynamic problem by taking the simple
average of the maximum total potential utility. This upper bound is independent of the












First we analyze whether or when the upper bound is tight. To attain the upper bound
UBdy, we need to attain Umax for each job j in each period p. In general, assigning job j
to a worker i who has been assigned to better jobs s < j in previous periods increase the
potential utility of job j in the current period, because jobs s was moved to the bottom of
the preference list of worker i. In period one, each job j attains Umax(j, 1) = n− j + 1. In
period two, equation (4.16) shows that in order to achieve the maximum potential utility,
exactly n−1 jobs need to improve their utility by 1. With job 1 already attains the maximum
utility, we need every job from 2 to n to be assigned to workers who was assigned a better
job in period one. The only feasible assignment that meets this requirement is to assign
130
worker j to job j +1 for j ≤ n− 1 and assign job 1 to worker n. By induction on period t,
there exists an unique assignment that attains Umax(j, t) for any job j and period t, which
we summarize below as the “rotating assignment”.
1. In period one, assign worker k to job k and let N(1, k) = k, ∀k ∈ [n].
2. In period t ≥ 2, we have the assignment of each worker k in the previous period
N(t− 1, k). We assign worker k to job N(t− 1, k) + 1 if N(t− 1, k) + 1 ≤ n and
to job 1 otherwise.
We can view the rotating assignment as rotating jobs over workers with higher ranked
orders in each period. At the same time, the assignment shuffles the preference lists of
workers. In period t ≥ 2, job j > t is assigned to worker j − t + 1, which decreases
as t increases. From period one through t, job j > t attains the least utility among jobs
assigned to worker j − t + 1. Therefore, job j > t attains Umax(j, t) = n − j + t. For
job j < t, the maximum utility m is attained as job j is the favorite job in period t for
the worker job j is assigned to. The rotating assignment is stable in period one but not
in other periods. After t = n periods, the preference lists of workers satisfy Horizontal
heterogeneity and all subsequent assignments are stable. Therefore for a p period problem,
the rotating assignment only provides a 1
p
-stable solution when p < n.
C.3 Formulation of the dynamic problem, p = 3, α = 2
3
Decision variables:
For p = 3, i, j ∈ [n], k ∈ [p], and α = 2
3
xkij = 1, if worker i is assigned to job j in period i, binary variable.
ckij = the amount of utility from job j for worker i in period k, non-negative continuous.
skij = the stability generated from pair (i, j) in period k, non-negative continuous.
Objective function: maximizing U .
Constraints:
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1. Assignment constraints: ∀i ∈ [n], k ∈ [p]
n∑
i=1
xkij = 1 (C.46)
n∑
j=1
xkij = 1 (C.47)
2. Utility constraints: ∀i, j ∈ [n] and k ∈ [p]
ckij ≤ (n− j + k) · xkij (C.48)
If x1ij = 1 then c
2
ij ≤ 1 (C.49)
If x2ij = 1 then c
3
ij ≤ 1 (C.50)
If x1ij = 1 then c
3




x1ij = 0 then c
2






ij = 0 then c
3






ij = 1 then c
3












ij = 2 and ∀j, x1ij + x2ij ≤ 1 then c3ij ≤ (n− j + 3) · x3jk (C.56)










skij ≥ 3α, ∀i, j ∈ [n] (C.58)
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If x1ij = 1 then s
2












x2iq − x2il (C.60)















If x1ij = 1 and x
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If x1il = 1, x
2








x2iq − x2il − x2im (C.64)
If x1il = 1, x
2








x2iq − x2il (C.65)
If x1il = 1, x
2








x2iq − x2im (C.66)
If x1il = 1, x
2














ckij ≥ U (C.68)
C.4 Job categories
The dynamic preference lists discussed in section 4.6 considers the situation in which
worker moves the previous assignments to the bottom of the preference lists. When the
number of job is large, the preference change may not be significant for small periods.
In this section, we consider the situation where nm jobs can be divided into n categories
with the same number of jobs m in each category. The dynamics on workers’ preference
changes as follows: if workers are assigned to a job in category c in the current period, then
in the next period all jobs in category c will move to the bottom of workers’ preference
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lists. In this case, we allow the preference lists of workers change more significantly in
one period. We refer this new problem “the job category problem”. The relative ranked
orders of jobs inside the same category do not change over time. We assume workers have
identical preference lists in period one and the utility function is reverse rank utility. The
dynamic preference lists discussed in section 4.6 is a special case with one job in each job
category.
The most significant difference between the dynamic problem and the job category
problem is the magnitude of change in workers’ preference lists. In a way, we can view
good solutions from the dynamic problem as efficient mechanics to rotate job categories
for all workers. Depending on the number of jobs in each job category (m), just using
the same job rotation as the smaller dynamic problem could be sufficient in obtaining a
good assignment for the job category problem. To quantify the performance of this simple
derived heuristic, we first analyze the relations of the optimal solution between the two
problems.
Suppose we have a feasible assignmentN , with p rows and nm columns and each entry
(i, j) indicating the job assigned to worker j in period i. Consider another matrix N ′ with
the same size and each entry indicating the job category assigned to each worker in each
period. For each column k of the assignment matrix N , we define two utility scores:
1. Job utility sk ∈ [p, pnm], the total utility of jobs for worker k in all periods, and
2. Category utility tk ∈ [p, pn], the total utility of job categories for worker k in all
periods.
For any worker k ∈ [n] with category utility tk, we calculate the range of job utility sk. In
the best scenario, worker k is assigned to the best job in the corresponding job categories
that give a category utility tk. The maximum job utility is then mp · tk. Similar in the
worst scenarios, worker k is assigned to the worst job in each period. Since the number
of job in each job category is m, the difference between the maximum and minimum job
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utility for the same category utility sk is (m − 1)p. Therefore, the minimum job utility is
mp · tk − (m− 1)p = mp · (tk − 1) + p. The range of job utility sk for the same category
utility tk is
mp · (tk − 1) + p ≤ sk ≤ mp · tk. (C.69)
With the quantified relation between sk and tk, we show that workers with a lower job
utility always has a lower category utility.
Theorem 15. For all 1 ≤ k1, k2 ≤ nm, if sk1 ≤ sk2 , then tk1 ≤ tk2
Proof. Suppose there exists 1 ≤ k1, k2 ≤ nm such that sk1 ≤ sk2 and tk1 ≥ tk2 + 1. By
inequality (C.69) we have:
sk2 ≥ sk1 ≥ (tk1 − 1)mp+ p ≥ tk2mp+ p > tk2mp ≥ sk2 (C.70)
which is a contradiction. Therefore, sk1 ≤ sk2 =⇒ tk1 ≤ tk2 .
Since sk1 ≤ sk2 =⇒ tk1 ≤ tk2 is equivalent to tk1 > tk2 =⇒ sk1 > sk2 , we can relate
the optimal solutions of the two problems using the following Corollary 16.
Corollary 16. If we have an optimal solution with value t∗ for the dynamic problem with
size n, then there exists an optimal solution of the job category problem with all workers
s ∈ [nm] having ts ≥ t∗.
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 15.
Corollary 16 clears the way for designing Heuristic C.4 that utilizes the job category
rotations by solving a size n dynamic problem and then assigns workers to jobs within the
same job category according to the worker-optimal stable matching.
135
1. Let a p by n matrix N be an α-stable assignment for the size n dynamic problem.
Expand each column of n by m times, with columns (l−1)m+1 through lm having
the same values as the original column l.
2. Create a p by nmmatrixN ′. For each worker j obtain the remainder rj = j mod m
and assign N ′(k, j) = (N(k, j)− 1) ·m+m− rj = N(k, j) ·m− rj .
Across the job categories, the stability requirement is satisfied since N is α-stable. Within
job category, we assign the worker-optimal stable matchings and all pairs are α-stable. The
solution has the property that workers (l − 1)m + 1 through lm have the same category
utility for all l ∈ [n]. When the number of jobs in each job category (m) is large, the
preference lists for workers can be significantly different. As a result, it is harder to come
up with sufficient conditions similar to that in Corollary 10.
Next we quantify the performance of the job category heuristic. Let UBdy(n, p) be the
upper bound value for the dynamic problem with size n and period p. Let S be the objective
function value returned from the dynamic heuristics. For m workers with category utility
t, the max-min utility is the average of the maximum and minimum value:
Opt =
(mp(t− 1) + p+mpt)m
2m
= mpt− (m− 1)p
2
(C.71)
By inequality (C.69) we have that









Notice that if m = 1 then the equation reduces to Gap = 1− S
UB
, which is exactly the gap









This quantity is very close to the original gap 1− S
UB
as when m goes to infinity, n has to
go to infinite and S and UB are very large compared to 1 and 1
2
.
C.5 Pseudocode of algorithms, heuristics, and procedures
In this section we provide example pseudocode for the algorithms and heuristics developed
in Chapter 4. We only present the pseudocode for when workers and jobs have identical
preference lists. Below we list commonly used notations in the pseudocodes.
1. ”++ (−−)”: adding (subtracting) one to (from) the current variable
2. ”+ = x(− = x)”: adding (subtracting) x to (from) the current variable
3. M(i, :): the ith row of matrix M ; M(:, j) is the j th column of matrix M
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Algorithm 1 Procedure to find upper bound on the objective function value when the work-
ers have the same preference lists
1: procedure INITIALIZATION(n, i, p)
2: M ← n× n matrix with each entry 0;




5: k ← 1;
6: CU ← pn;
7: while bARc ≤ CU do
8: M(k, k)← i;
9: index← b(p− i)(k − 1)/pc ;
10: Remain← (p− i)(k − 1)− p · index;
11: if Remain ≤ i then
12: M(k, n− index)← p− i;
13: CU ← i(n− k + 1) + un−index(p− i);
14: else
15: M(k, n− index)← p−Remain;
16: M(k, n− index− 1)← Remain− i;
17: CU ← i(n− k+ 1) + un−index(p−Remain) + un−index−1(Remain− i);
18: end if
19: TU ← TU − CU ;
20: AR← TU/(n− k);
21: k ++;
22: end while
23: k∗ ← k − 1;
24: ub← b(TU + CU)/(n− k∗)c;
25: end procedure
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Algorithm 2 Transform any optimal solution to one with the assignments of the first k∗
workers specified in Algorithm 1. This algorithm uses procedure SWITCH (see Appendix).
Input: k∗,M
1: for 1 ≤ k ≤ k∗ do
2: while
∑k
s=1M(s, k) > i do
3: a← argmins{s : s > k,M(k, s) 6=M0(k, s)};
4: b← argmaxs{s : s > k,M(k, s) 6=M0(k, s)};
5: w∗ ← argmaxw{w : w 6= k,M(w, b) > M0(w, b)};
6: M ← SWITCH(M(k),M(w∗), a, b);
7: end while
8: while M(k, k) < i ∧
∑k
s=1M(ws, k) = i do
9: a← argmins{s : s > k,M(k, s) 6=M0(k, s)};
10: w∗ ← argminw{w : w 6= k,M(w, k) > M0(w, k)};
11: M ← SWITCH(M(k),M(w∗), a, k);
12: end while
13: Jk ← {s : s > k,M(k, s) 6=M0(k, s)};
14: while Jk 6= ∅ do
15: j∗ ← argmins{s : s ∈ Jk};
16: j′ ← argmaxs{s : s ∈ Jk};
17: w∗ ← argmaxw{w : w 6= k,M(w, j′) > M0(w, j′)};
18: M(k, j∗)←M(k, j∗)− 1;






20: while Wk 6= ∅ do
21: w∗ ← {w : w ∈ Wk, w >j∗ s,∀s 6= w};
22: M(w∗, j∗)←M(w∗, j∗) + 1;
23: j′ ← argmaxs{s :M(w∗, s) ≥ 1, us < uj∗};
24: M(w∗, j′)←M(w∗, j′)− 1;





M(w, j′) < i};
26: j∗ ← j′;
27: end while
28: M(k, j′)←M(k, j′) + 1;
29: Jk ← {s : s > k,M(k, s) 6=M0(k, s)};
30: end while
31: end for
32: M ′ ←M ;
Output: M ′;
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Algorithm 3 Algorithm to find equal utility among workers when α ≤ dp/2e
p
1: procedure EQUALUTILITY(n, p)
2: M ← n× n matrix with each entry zero;
3: if p (mod 2) = 1 then
4: for 1 ≤ k ≤ n do




















9: p← p− 3;
10: end if
11: for 1 ≤ k ≤ n do
12: M(k, k)←M(k, k) + p
2
;






Heuristic 1 Heuristic for utility is reverse rank and α ≤ 3
4
Input: n, i, p, dp/2e
p
≤ α ≤ 3
4
;
1: for 1 ≤ k ≤ dn
2
e do
2: M(k, k)← i;
3: M(k, n− k + 1)← p− i ;
4: end for
5: if 2i− p = 1 then
6: if p > 3 then
7: M(k, n− k + 1)← p− i;




e+ 1 ≤ k ≤ n do



































































+ 1 ≤ k ≤ n; do
22: M(k, n− k + 1)← p− i;
23: M(k, k)← p− i;


































Heuristic 2 Heuristic for utility is reverse rank α > 3
4
Input: n, i, p, α > 3
4
;
1: ub← INITIALIZATION(n, i, p);
2: M ← n× n zero matrix, except entry (n, n) is p;
3: free(1)← p− i− 1;
4: free(k)← p− i,∀k ≥ 2;
5: CU ← p; . utility of worker in the current iteration
6: NU ← p+ n; . utility of worker in the next iteration
7: t← 0;
8: while |NU − ub| ≤ |CU − ub| do
9: index← argmink{k : free(k) > 0};
10: free(index)−−;
11: CU ← NU ;








; . number of workers treated as lower ranked
16: free(k)← p,∀k ∈ [p];
17: for 1 ≤ s ≤ n− x do
18: M(s, s)+ = i;
19: free(s)− = i;
20: end for
21: for s = n− x+ 1 to n do
22: M(s, s)+ = p− t;
23: free(s)− = p+ t;
24: for 1 ≤ k ≤ t do
25: index← argmink{k : free(k) > 0};




30: for s = n− x to 1 do
31: for 1 ≤ k ≤ p− i do
32: index← argmink{k : free(k) > 0};





Heuristic 3 Heuristic for utility is reverse rank α > 1
2




1: k∗, ub,M ← INITIALIZATION(n, i, p), prevent← 0;
2: free(1 : k∗)← n−
∑n
s=1M(s, 1 : k
∗);
3: for k∗ + 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1 do
4: i′ ← i− prevent; . number of jobs needed to satisfy stability
5: temp← zero vector with length n;
6: for 1 ≤ s ≤ i′ do . satisfy stability with minimum utility
7: index← argmaxq{q : free(q) > 0, q ≤ k};
8: temp(index) + +;
9: free(index)−−;
10: end for
11: for 1 ≤ k ≤ p− i do . assign the rest jobs with minimum utility
12: index← argmaxq{q : free(q) > 0};
13: temp(index) + +;
14: free(index)−−;
15: end for
16: j′ ← argminq{q : free(q) > 0}; . identify which jobs to switch
17: j∗ ← argmaxq{q : temp(q) > 0};
18: CU ←
∑n
q=1 uq(temp(q) +M(k, q));
19: if j∗ ≤ k then
20: M ′ ←M(k : n, :);
21: free,M ′ ← MIN2MAX(free, temp, n, p,M ′);
22: M(k : n, :)+ =M ′;
23: break
24: else
25: if |s : free(s) > 0, s > k| ≤ 1; then
26: index← j∗; . switch out job with least utility
27: else
28: index← argmaxq{q : temp(q) > 0, q 6= j∗};
29: end if
30: temp, free← BOOST(index, j′, ub, CU, temp, free);
31: set← argminq{q : temp(q) > 0 ∩ argminq(|index− q| − (ub− CU))};









q=1M(s, q))(n− k + 1))
⌋}
;
34: if temp(k) < i− prevent then
35: free, prevent,M, temp← PREVENT(n, i, p, k, free,M, temp);
36: end if
37: end if




Heuristic 4 Heuristic for dynamic preference list p = 3, α ≤ 1
3
Input: n, P (n by n matrix with each row workers’ preference list)
1: N ← 3× n zero matrix;
2: avail← size n vector with each entry 2;
3: for 1 ≤ k ≤ n do
4: N(1, k)← k;
5: index← arg{P (k, :) = k};
6: UPDATE(P);
7: end for
8: for 1 ≤ c ≤ 2n do
9: if c ≤ n then
10: k = c;
11: else
12: k = c− n;
13: end if
14: best← argmins{avail(s) > 0};
15: index← arg{P (k, :) = best};











17: N(2, k)← P (k, index);
18: else







Heuristic 5 Heuristic for dynamic preference list p = 3, α > 1
3
Input: n, P (n by n matrix with each row workers’ preference list)
1: N ← 3× n zero matrix;
2: for 1 ≤ k ≤ n do
3: N(1, k)← k;
4: index← arg{P (k, :) = k};
5: UPDATE(P);






7: N(2, k)← k + 1;






9: N(2, k)← k − 1;
10: end if
11: end for
12: if n mod 2 = 1 then

















15: avail← size n vector with entries 2 except index.
16: else
17: avail← size n vector with each entry 1.
18: end if










































26: best← argmins≤dn2 e{avail(s) > 0};
27: index← arg{P (k, :) = best};
28: N(3, k)← P (k, index);
29: else
30: best← argmins>dn2 e{avail(s) > 0};
31: index← arg{P (k, :) = best};







Procedure 1 Switching job i from worker v1 to v2 and job j from worker v2 to v1
1: procedure SWITCH(v1, v2, i, j)
2: v1(i)−−;
3: v2(i) + +;
4: v1(j) + +;
5: v2(j)−−;
6: end procedure
Procedure 2 Boost: part of Heuristic 3 for improving performances
1: procedure BOOST(index, j′, ub, CU, temp, free)
2: while do(index− j′) < (ub− CU)
3: if j′ − index ≥ 0 then
4: break
5: else
6: temp(j′, 1) + +;
7: temp(index, 1)−−;
8: free(j′)−−;
9: free(index) + +;
10: j′ ← argminq{q : free(q) > 0};
11: vec← {l : temp(l) = 1};
12: CU =
∑n
k=1 k(temp(k) +M(j, k));
13: if then
∑
k(vec(k) > j) ≤ 1;
14: index = vec(end);
15: else






Procedure 3 Prevent: part of Heuristic 3 for guaranteeing stability
1: procedure PREVENT(n, i, p, j, free,M, temp)
2: for 1 ≤ z ≤ i− prevent− temp(j) do
3: if
∑j−1
k=1 free(j) ≥ n− j then
4: for j + 1 ≤ k ≤ n do
5: vec← {l : freeJobs(l) > 0};





11: vec← {l : temp(l) > 0, l ≤ j − 1};
12: temp(vec(end), 1)−−;
13: temp(j, 1) + +]
14: free(j)−−;




Procedure 4 Min2Max: the last part of Heuristic 3 that assign the best available jobs to
workers with the minimum utility
1: procedure PREVENT(n, p, j, free,M ′)




3: indFree← {l : free(l) > 0};
4: for 1 ≤ k ≤ n do
5: rank(k) =
∑n
k=1 k ·M(k, :);
6: end for
7: for 1 ≤ s ≤ length(indFree) do
8: for 1 ≤ k ≤ free(indFree(s)) do
9: index1← {l : rank(l) = minm(rank(assign(m) < p))};
10: index2← {l : assign(l) < p};
11: index← index1 ∩ index2;
12: index← index(end);
13: M ′(index, indexFree(s)) + +;
14: rank(index)+ = n− indFree(s) + 1;




19: minRank ← minl(
∑
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